Unlike equity investors hunting for uncapped upside, debt lenders have a fixed return and are intolerant to losing principal. This forces them to be paranoid about downside risk and worst-case scenarios. Their diligence process is often more thorough and thoughtful, providing a different and rigorous lens on the business.

Aggressive Liability Management Exercises (LMEs), common in the US, are rarer in Europe. This isn't due to a gentler culture but stricter laws where board directors can face criminal charges for insolvency. This incentivizes collaborative restructuring over contentious, US-style creditor battles.

The term 'private equity' replaced 'leveraged buyout' (LBO) after the LBO boom of the 1980s ended in a wave of high-profile bankruptcies. Howard Marks notes this name change was a deliberate marketing move to shed negative connotations and attract fresh capital to a reinvented industry.

Contrary to fears of a frothy market, current M&A and LBO activity is more conservative than the 2007 era. A key difference is that today's deals involve a substantially higher amount of equity contribution from buyers, making them structurally less risky than those seen before the financial crisis.

Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.

Investors are drawn to PE's smooth, bond-like volatility reporting. However, the underlying assets are small, highly indebted companies, which are inherently much riskier than public equities. This mismatch between perceived risk (low) and actual risk (high) creates a major portfolio allocation error.

Regulatory leverage lending guidelines, which capped bank participation in highly leveraged deals at six times leverage, created a market void. This constraint directly spurred the growth of the private credit industry, which stepped in to provide capital for transactions that banks could no longer underwrite.

To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.

Jeff Aronson reframes "distressed-for-control" as a private equity strategy, not a credit one. While a traditional LBO uses leverage to acquire a company, a distressed-for-control transaction achieves the same end—ownership—by deleveraging the company through a debt-to-equity conversion. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical.