Jeff Aronson reframes "distressed-for-control" as a private equity strategy, not a credit one. While a traditional LBO uses leverage to acquire a company, a distressed-for-control transaction achieves the same end—ownership—by deleveraging the company through a debt-to-equity conversion. The mechanism differs, but the outcome is identical.

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Private equity and venture capital funds create an illusion of stability by avoiding daily mark-to-market pricing. This "laundering of volatility" is a core reason companies stay private longer. It reveals a key, if artificial, benefit of private markets that new technologies like tokenization could disrupt.

To prevent the next generation of leaders from being burdened by debt, WCM's founders transfer their ownership stakes at book value—not market value. This massive personal financial sacrifice is designed to ensure the firm's long-term health and stability over founder enrichment.

Activists can be effective even in companies with dual-class shares or founder control. The mechanism for influence is not the threat of a proxy fight but the power of good ideas and relationships to achieve strategic alignment with the controlling party.

The classic distressed debt strategy is broken. Market dislocation windows are now incredibly narrow, often lasting just days. Furthermore, low interest rates for the past decade eliminated the ability to earn meaningful carry on discounted debt. This has forced distressed funds to rebrand as 'capital solutions' and focus on private, structured deals.

In a distressed scenario, simply asserting seniority as a junior capital provider is ineffective. You cannot force the majority owner and management team, whom you've just told are worthless, to run the business for your benefit. The only viable path is to renegotiate and realign incentives for all parties to work towards a recovery together.

In a competitive M&A process where the target is reluctant, a marginal price increase may not work. A winning strategy can be to 'overpay' significantly. This makes the offer financially indefensible for the board to reject and immediately ends the bidding process, guaranteeing the acquisition.

To source proprietary hybrid capital deals, avoid the capital markets teams at PE firms, as their job is to minimize cost of capital. Instead, build relationships directly with individual deal partners in specific industries. This allows you to become a trusted, go-to provider for complex, time-sensitive situations where speed and certainty are valued over price.

For legacy companies in declining industries, a massive, 'bet the ranch' acquisition is not an offensive growth strategy but a defensive, existential one. The primary motivation is to gain scale and avoid becoming the smallest, most vulnerable player in a consolidating market, even if it requires stretching financially.

A credit investor's true edge lies not in understanding a company's operations, but in mastering the right-hand side of the balance sheet. This includes legal structures, credit agreements, and bankruptcy processes. Private equity investors, who are owners, will always have superior knowledge of the business itself (the left-hand side).

The popular narrative of a looming 'wall of maturities' is a fallacy used in investor presentations. Good companies proactively refinance their debt well ahead of time. It's only the poorly managed or fundamentally flawed businesses that are unable to refinance and face a maturity crisis, a fact the market quickly identifies.