The summit represents a temporary lull in an ongoing, long-term competition, not a fundamental shift toward resolution. Beijing views it as a tactical 'test of wills' to buy time and strengthen its capabilities while maintaining a competitive mindset.

By publicly stating a desire to avoid the historical pattern of a rising power (China) clashing with a declining one (US), Xi Jinping strategically framed the future of the relationship as an economic partnership rather than an inevitable military conflict.

The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.

Despite potentially positive "vibes" from diplomatic summits, the national security establishments in both the US and China will likely continue to view each other as implacable adversaries. This creates a disconnect where public-facing diplomacy fails to alter the underlying suspicion and strategic competition driven by each country's "deep state."

A purely cooperative approach to AI arms control with China is unlikely to work due to their inherent skepticism. A more effective realpolitik strategy may be for the U.S. to advance its AI capabilities so far and fast that China feels compelled to negotiate out of self-interest to avoid being hopelessly behind.

Unlike the US and Russia, China never experienced a visceral, nation-defining moment where nuclear annihilation seemed imminent. This lack of shared trauma and cultural resonance means their leadership often views arms control not as a mutual survival necessity, but as a potential American strategic trick.

China's role as a global peacemaker is fundamentally limited because it is unwilling to act as a military security guarantor. While it supports mediation, its refusal to commit troops to enforce peace agreements creates a major credibility gap in its diplomatic initiatives.

China's nuclear strategy differs from the Cold War dynamic. While the US and Soviets were near parity, incentivizing de-escalation, China lags far behind with only 600 warheads to the US's 5,300. This massive gap provides a strong strategic incentive for China to rapidly build its arsenal to gain leverage, particularly regarding Taiwan.

While the West debates 'Peak China,' Beijing operates under its own 'Peak America' theory. It interprets aggressive US actions not as signs of strength, but as the desperate flailing of a declining power that recognizes time is no longer on its side.