Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.

By dismantling the post-WWII global order, the Trump administration forces allies to realign with China. As the U.S. retreats from global partnerships, China is positioned to dominate key industries like renewable energy, making the 21st century "the China century" by default as the world moves on without America.

The core driver of a 'Thucydides Trap' conflict is the psychological distress experienced by the ruling power. For the U.S., the challenge to its identity as '#1' creates a disorienting fear and paranoia, making it prone to miscalculation, independent of actual military or economic shifts.

Citing a historical pattern, the speaker notes that 12 out of the last 16 times a rising power (like China) has confronted a ruling power (like the US), the result has been war. This 'Thucydides Trap' suggests a high statistical probability of military conflict.

While the U.S. employs aggressive, short-term tactics, China plays a long game. They use economic incentives and a 'friendly' image to win allies, which erodes America's global standing over time as nations seek a less volatile partner.

The US's global power is eroding due to debt and inflation. Trump's aggressive foreign policy is not random; it's a high-risk strategy to press America's current advantage and re-establish dominance before rivals like China can take over. The only alternative is accepting a managed decline.

Beijing interprets America's focus on regions like Latin America or the Middle East with a 'shoulder shrug.' They see these distractions as beneficial, giving them more freedom to aggressively pursue their own interests and push allies in the Indo-Pacific without US interference.

China's inner circle, led by Xi Jinping, believes the U.S. is in terminal decline. They view American social and political paradoxes—like New York, the center of capitalism, electing a socialist—not as features of a complex democracy, but as evidence of a fracturing and decaying society.

Viewing China as a "rising" power is incorrect; it's a "reascending" one. For 70% of the years since 1500, China had the world's largest GDP. Its current trajectory is a return to its historical dominance, a framing that fundamentally alters the understanding of its global ambitions.