The idea of an independent Fed is a relatively modern concept, dating effectively to 1951. Historically, from its creation in 1913, the Fed has consistently acted as an arm of the state, financing wars and executing government policy, making the current shift towards explicit statecraft a return to its roots.
Related Insights
The appointment of Kevin Warsh as Fed Chair shifts the focus from purely economic decisions to a fundamental governance question: will the central bank remain independent or take political orders from the president? This represents a potential paradigm shift in the separation of powers.
The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.
Central bank independence is a relatively new concept from the 1990s. Historically, central banks operated as junior partners to the government, executing industrial policy. The move to subordinate the Fed to the Treasury is a return to a long-standing historical model.
Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.
Arthur Laffer frames the creation of the Fed as the government taking over a previously private monetary system. He notes that from 1776 to 1913, with a private money system, long-term inflation was zero. Since the Fed's creation, the price level has risen 35-fold, demonstrating the instability introduced by government control.
The nomination of Kevin Warsh as Fed Chair is not a traditional hawk vs. dove decision. Instead, it signals the Federal Reserve's transformation into a subordinate arm of the Treasury, tasked with executing a nationalist 'economic statecraft' agenda rather than maintaining its theoretical independence and focusing on traditional inflation targets.
Under "fiscal dominance," the U.S. government's massive debt dictates Federal Reserve policy. The Fed must keep rates low enough for the government to afford interest payments, even if it fuels inflation. Monetary policy is no longer about managing the economy but about preventing a debt-driven collapse, making the Fed reactive, not proactive.
The debate over Fed independence is misplaced; it has already been compromised. Evidence includes preemptive reappointments of regional bank presidents and outspokenness from governors concerned about being bullied, indicating the Fed no longer operates in its prior insulated environment.
Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.
In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.
