Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.

Related Insights

The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.

Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.

The consideration of Kevin Hassett for Fed Chair highlights a significant change in the expected profile for the role. Once viewed as a technocratic economist who published in academic journals, Hassett is now widely seen as a partisan political operator, raising questions about whether the Fed will be led by an independent expert or a political agent.

The threat to the Federal Reserve's independence is not limited to a single appointment. It involves a broader potential strategy of simultaneously nominating a chair, replacing other board members like Lisa Cook, and filling vacancies as they arise. This creates the possibility for a majority of the Fed board to become politically aligned with the administration.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

While political pressure on the Federal Reserve is notable, the central bank's shift towards rate cuts is grounded in economic data. Decelerating employment and signs of increasing labor market slack provide a solid, data-driven justification for their policy recalibration, independent of political influence.

Under "fiscal dominance," the U.S. government's massive debt dictates Federal Reserve policy. The Fed must keep rates low enough for the government to afford interest payments, even if it fuels inflation. Monetary policy is no longer about managing the economy but about preventing a debt-driven collapse, making the Fed reactive, not proactive.

Alan Blinder argues that financial markets are severely underpricing the risk of political interference at the Federal Reserve. He cites the President's attempt to remove a governor and political appointments as clear threats that defy historical norms, calling it "one of the biggest underreactions" he's ever seen.

The Federal Reserve is pressured to cut rates not just for economic stability, but to protect its own independence. Failing to act pre-emptively could lead to a recession, for which the Fed would be blamed. This would invite intense political pressure and calls for executive oversight, making rate cuts a defensive institutional maneuver.

In periods of 'fiscal dominance,' where government debt and deficits are high, a central bank's independence inevitably erodes. Its primary function shifts from controlling inflation to ensuring the government can finance its spending, often through financial repression like yield curve control.

The Federal Reserve's Independence Is an Illusion; Presidents Always Get Their Desired Monetary Policy | RiffOn