The appointment of Kevin Warsh as Fed Chair shifts the focus from purely economic decisions to a fundamental governance question: will the central bank remain independent or take political orders from the president? This represents a potential paradigm shift in the separation of powers.

The Fed's recent rate cuts, despite strong economic indicators, are seen as a capitulation to political pressure. This suggests the central bank is now functioning as a "political utility" to manage government debt, marking a victory for political influence over its traditional independence.

Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

Despite intense political criticism, a coalition including former Fed chairs, Treasury secretaries from both parties, and major bank CEOs has publicly defended the central bank's independence. This signals that markets view a non-politicized Fed as critical for economic stability, overriding political allegiances.

As the Federal Reserve becomes more aligned with the executive branch, its traditional mandate to control inflation independently weakens. Consequently, voters may start holding the incumbent political party directly responsible for rising prices, making inflation a key electoral issue rather than a purely monetary one.

Under "fiscal dominance," the U.S. government's massive debt dictates Federal Reserve policy. The Fed must keep rates low enough for the government to afford interest payments, even if it fuels inflation. Monetary policy is no longer about managing the economy but about preventing a debt-driven collapse, making the Fed reactive, not proactive.

The debate over Fed independence is misplaced; it has already been compromised. Evidence includes preemptive reappointments of regional bank presidents and outspokenness from governors concerned about being bullied, indicating the Fed no longer operates in its prior insulated environment.

Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.