A company with modest growth experimented with niche content for a small user segment, revealing a massive, underserved market. This led to a second, separate app that quickly surpassed the original product's revenue and drove hyper-growth, challenging the "focus on one thing" dogma.

Initial data suggested the market for design tools was too small to build a large business. Figma's founders bet on the trend that design was becoming a key business differentiator, which would force the market to expand. They focused on building for the trend, not the existing TAM.

Successful startups tap into organic customer needs that already exist—a 'pull' from the market. In contrast, 'conjuring demand' involves a founder trying to convince a market of a new worldview without prior evidence. This is a much harder and less reliable path to building a business.

A founder's success is more dependent on the product's intrinsic value than their operational skills. The best marketer cannot overcome the headwind of a mediocre product that doesn't deserve to be on the shelf. A great product creates a natural tailwind, making growth significantly easier and attracting opportunities.

Obsessing over creating a new market category is often a mistake. Data shows the vast majority of successful public tech companies compete within established categories. It's more effective to get "invited to the party" by using a known category label and then winning with a sharp, differentiated value proposition.

Instead of a broad launch, Everflow targeted only mobile affiliate networks—a small market they knew deeply from their previous company. This allowed them to build very specific, high-value features for that ICP, win deals, and establish a strong beachhead before expanding into larger, adjacent markets.

Figma's market initially seemed too small to attract major VC interest or intense competition, giving them space to build a defensible product. Founders can gain a significant advantage by working in overlooked spaces, provided they have genuine passion to sustain them for a decade or more.

Don't fear competitive "red oceans"; they signal huge demand. The winning strategy is to start in an artificially constrained niche (a puddle) where you can dominate. Once you're the biggest fish there, sequentially expand your market to a pond, then a lake, and finally the ocean.

Product-market fit can be accidental. Even companies with millions in ARR may not initially understand *why* customers buy. They must retroactively apply frameworks to uncover the true demand drivers, which is critical for future growth, replication in new segments, and avoiding wrong turns.