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The Global War on Terror consumed resources, forcing services like the Navy and Air Force to pursue ambitious tech transformations on tight budgets. This led to disasters like the Littoral Combat Ship and F-35, from which they haven't fully recovered.

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Congressional appropriators hate program changes or cancellations because it forces them to admit to their constituents that a previously funded project failed. This political pressure creates powerful inertia, forcing the military to continue with suboptimal programs and preventing agile shifts in resource allocation.

The nearly trillion-dollar US defense budget is misleading. The vast majority is locked into fixed costs like salaries, facilities, and sustaining legacy systems. The actual procurement budget for new technology is at a historic low as a percentage of GDP, constraining modernization.

A singular, massive cash infusion into the defense budget encourages buying more of today's systems, filling order books for weapons with built-in obsolescence. This approach creates a short-term 'sugar high' but fails to fund the adaptive industrial infrastructure needed for future conflicts, ultimately leading to a less capable force.

The US military struggles to scale production of low-cost drones not due to a lack of technical ability, but because its procurement system fails to provide the long-term, multi-year funding commitments industry needs. Without these signals, companies and their supply chains won't risk the capital investment required for mass production.

The US Navy is shrinking despite stated goals to expand against threats like China, largely due to congressional budget dysfunction. "Continuing resolutions" prevent new ship starts and lead to billions in waste, while the Pentagon as a whole fails to spend about $15 billion annually, money which eventually evaporates.

The US defense industry is hampered by Congress's reliance on one-year funding and 'Continuing Resolutions' (CRs). CRs prohibit 'new starts,' preventing the Pentagon from launching new technology programs. This lack of multi-year budget authority discourages private investment and slows modernization.

Pahlka recounts a senior Air Force leader claiming a 50% budget cut would force the DOD to be more effective. Severe constraints would eliminate bloated, slow-moving projects and compel the adoption of faster, streamlined processes, ultimately improving defense capability.

The Pentagon is moving away from decades-long, multi-billion dollar projects like aircraft carriers. The new focus is on mass-produced, attributable, low-cost systems like drones, which allows for faster innovation and deployment from new defense tech startups, not just the old primes.

When purchasing a new ship or aircraft, the initial price tag is deceptive. The 'fully burdened cost' includes long-term expenses for crewing, training, support, and maintenance. A one-time budget increase doesn't cover this tail, forcing the military to retire platforms early and resulting in no net growth of the force.

The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.