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The US defense industry is hampered by Congress's reliance on one-year funding and 'Continuing Resolutions' (CRs). CRs prohibit 'new starts,' preventing the Pentagon from launching new technology programs. This lack of multi-year budget authority discourages private investment and slows modernization.
Congressional appropriators hate program changes or cancellations because it forces them to admit to their constituents that a previously funded project failed. This political pressure creates powerful inertia, forcing the military to continue with suboptimal programs and preventing agile shifts in resource allocation.
The nearly trillion-dollar US defense budget is misleading. The vast majority is locked into fixed costs like salaries, facilities, and sustaining legacy systems. The actual procurement budget for new technology is at a historic low as a percentage of GDP, constraining modernization.
A singular, massive cash infusion into the defense budget encourages buying more of today's systems, filling order books for weapons with built-in obsolescence. This approach creates a short-term 'sugar high' but fails to fund the adaptive industrial infrastructure needed for future conflicts, ultimately leading to a less capable force.
Frank Kendall argues that criticism of defense primes is misplaced. The defense industrial base builds what its customer, the Department of Defense, asks for. To get cheaper, simpler, and more innovative products, the services must change their requirements and demand them. The problem lies with the customer, not the supplier.
In a major strategic shift, the Pentagon is asking prime defense contractors to invest their own capital—billions of dollars—to expand munition production "on spec." This pushes immense financial risk onto publicly traded companies, a difficult ask given the government's historically cyclical and unreliable purchasing patterns.
The US Navy is shrinking despite stated goals to expand against threats like China, largely due to congressional budget dysfunction. "Continuing resolutions" prevent new ship starts and lead to billions in waste, while the Pentagon as a whole fails to spend about $15 billion annually, money which eventually evaporates.
The American defense industrial base is not constrained by a lack of capital but by crippling uncertainty over future demand. The reliance on single-year congressional budgets prevents companies from making the long-term, multi-year investments necessary to plan for and build capacity efficiently.
A massive one-year defense budget increase is insufficient for rebuilding war stocks. The defense industry requires a sustained, multi-year funding commitment to justify long-term investments in expanding supply chains and hiring, which a temporary spike fails to provide.
To boost production capacity, the Pentagon is moving away from traditional government funding. It now incentivizes defense companies to invest their own private capital to expand. This policy shift fosters ownership, efficiency, and levels the playing field for modern startups.
The perception of the defense budget as a massive fund for new technology is incorrect. More than half is allocated to fixed costs like personnel, facilities, and maintaining old equipment. The actual procurement budget for new systems is historically low as a percentage of GDP.