The disinflationary impact from goods prices has largely run its course in emerging markets. The remaining inflation is concentrated in the service sector, which is sticky and less responsive to monetary policy. This structural shift means the broad rate-cutting cycle is nearing its end, as central banks have limited tools to address services inflation.

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After a decade of zero rates and QE post-2008, the financial system can no longer function without continuous stimulus. Attempts to tighten policy, as seen with the 2018 repo crisis, immediately cause breakdowns, forcing central banks to reverse course and indicating a permanent state of intervention.

The Fed's rate hikes fail to address the root causes of inflation in housing, education, and healthcare. These sectors suffer from structural issues like regulation and bureaucracy. Higher rates can even be counterproductive, for instance, by stifling new housing construction, which restricts supply.

A paradoxical market reality is that sectors with heavy government involvement, like healthcare and education, experience skyrocketing costs. In contrast, less-regulated, technology-driven sectors see prices consistently fall, suggesting a correlation between intervention and price inflation.

A recent global fixed income sell-off was not triggered by a single U.S. event but by a cascade of disparate actions from central banks and data releases in smaller economies like Australia, New Zealand, and Japan. This decentralized shift is an unusual dynamic for markets, leading to dollar weakness.

Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.

Emerging vs. developed market outperformance typically runs in 7-10 year cycles. The current 14-year cycle of EM underperformance is historically long, suggesting markets are approaching a key inflection point driven by a weakening dollar, cheaper currencies, and accelerating earnings growth off a low base.

When government spending is massive ("fiscal dominance"), the Federal Reserve's ability to manage the economy via interest rates is neutralized. The government's deficit spending is so large that it dictates economic conditions, rendering rate cuts ineffective at solving structural problems.

Policymakers can maintain market stability as long as inflation volatility remains low, even if the absolute level is above target. A spike in CPI volatility is the true signal that breaks the system, forces a policy response, and makes long-term macro views suddenly relevant.

Despite strong export-led growth in Asia, the benefits did not trickle down to households. Weak household income and consumption prompted governments and central banks to implement fiscal support and monetary easing. This disconnect between headline GDP and domestic demand is a critical factor for understanding Asian economic policy.

Unlike the US, emerging markets are constrained by financial markets. If they let their fiscal balance deteriorate, markets punish their currency, triggering a vicious cycle of inflation and higher interest rates. This threat serves as a natural check on government spending, enforcing a level of fiscal responsibility.