Unlike the US's focus on quarterly results and election cycles, China's leadership operates on a civilizational timescale. From their perspective, the US is a recent phenomenon, and losing the US market is an acceptable short-term cost in a much longer game of survival and dominance. This fundamental difference in strategic thinking is often missed.
From China's perspective, producing more than it needs and exporting at cutthroat prices is a strategic tool, not an economic problem. This form of industrial warfare is designed to weaken other nations' manufacturing bases, prioritizing geopolitical goals over profit.
The dynamic between a rising power (China) and a ruling one (the U.S.) fits the historical pattern of the "Thucydides' trap." In 12 of the last 16 instances of this scenario, the confrontation has ended in open war, suggesting that a peaceful resolution is the exception, not the rule.
The tariff war was not primarily about revenue but a strategic move to create an "artificial negotiating point." By imposing tariffs, the U.S. could then offer reductions in exchange for European countries committing to American technology and supply chains over China's growing, low-cost alternatives.
Contrary to its goals, the U.S. trade war has resulted in self-isolation. Data shows the U.S. is the only country buying less from China, while U.S. allies and developing nations have increased their trade, leading to a record $1 trillion surplus for China. This highlights a strategic miscalculation in U.S. foreign trade policy.
Unlike the old Cold War with Russia, the U.S. and China's deep economic interdependence prevents open conflict. The current "Rice War" is like water polo: while business and diplomacy occur on the surface, a covert intelligence and influence war rages underneath.
Contrary to common perception, China holds the stronger hand in its relationship with the U.S. As the world's creditor and primary producer, China can sell its goods to billions of other global consumers. The U.S., as a debtor and consumer nation, is far more dependent on China than the other way around.
While the U.S. oscillates between trade policies with each new administration, China executes consistent long-term plans, like shifting to high-quality exports. This decisiveness has enabled China to find new global markets and achieve a record trade surplus, effectively outmaneuvering U.S. tactics.
Beyond raw materials, China's national ambition is to achieve near-total self-sufficiency. The prevailing mood is that there is "nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to." This philosophy of aggressive import substitution signals a fundamental break with the logic of reciprocal global trade.
Geopolitical adversaries with long-term leadership, like Iran, view the U.S.'s frequent changes in administration as a temporary inconvenience rather than a fundamental policy shift. They see the U.S. as an "obnoxious guy on the bus" whom they can simply ignore and outlast by staying their course.
From 2001 onwards, while the U.S. was militarily and economically distracted by the War on Terror, China executed a long-term strategy. It focused on acquiring Western technology and building indigenous capabilities in AI, telecom, and robotics, effectively creating a rival global economic system.