Years of low interest rates encouraged risk-taking, resulting in a large pool of low-rated loans (B3/B-). Now, sustained higher rates are stressing these weak capital structures, creating a boom in distressed debt opportunities even as the broader economy performs well.

Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

In large loan portfolios, defaults are not evenly distributed. As seen in a student loan example, the vast majority (90%) of defaults can originate from a specific sub-segment, like for-profit schools, and occur within a predictable timeframe, such as the first 18 months.

Recent stress in credit card and auto loan markets is concentrated in loans originated in 2021-2023 when stimulus and looser standards prevailed. Lenders have since tightened, and newer loan portfolios are performing better, suggesting the problem is not spreading systemically.

Over 15 years, auto loans transformed from the best-performing loan product to the riskiest. This shift is driven by a "double whammy" of soaring vehicle prices—which outpaced even mortgage growth—and rising interest rates, compounded by overlooked costs like insurance and repairs.

Problem loans from the 2021-22 era will take years to resolve due to private credit's tendency to "kick the can." This will lead to a prolonged period of underwhelming mid-single-digit returns, even in a strong economy, rather than a dramatic bust.

An alternative data point from Equifax reveals significant economic stress. The delinquency rate for subprime auto loans (borrowers with scores below 660) has reached 10%, a level higher than that observed during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, signaling trouble for lower-income households.

In a highly concerning paradox, delinquency rates for subprime auto loans are now higher than they were during the 2008 financial crisis when unemployment was 10%. This signals extreme stress among lower-income consumers even in a strong labor market.