Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.

The most imprudent lending decisions occur during economic booms. Widespread optimism, complacency, and fear of missing out cause investors to lower their standards and overlook risks, sowing the seeds for future failures that are only revealed in a downturn.

The credit market appears healthy based on tight average spreads, but this is misleading. A strong top 90% of the market pulls the average down, while the bottom 10% faces severe distress, with loans "dropping like a stone." The weight of prolonged high borrowing costs is creating a clear divide between healthy and struggling companies.

In large loan portfolios, defaults are not evenly distributed. As seen in a student loan example, the vast majority (90%) of defaults can originate from a specific sub-segment, like for-profit schools, and occur within a predictable timeframe, such as the first 18 months.

Despite headlines blaming private credit for failures like First Brands, the vast majority (over 95%) of the exposure lies with banks and in the liquid credit markets. This narrative overlooks the structural advantages and deeper diligence inherent in private deals.

Contrary to theories that recent blow-ups like Tricolor indicate more fraud is coming, the real issue is broad economic stress. Using Warren Buffett's "tide goes out" analogy, higher rates and persistent inflation are exposing fundamental weaknesses and squeezing consumers across large, non-AI sectors of the economy.

Recent credit failures and frauds are not 'systemic' risks that threaten the entire financial system's structure. Instead, they are 'systematic'—a regularly recurring behavioral phenomenon. Good times predictably lead to imprudent lending, creating clusters of defaults. The problem is human behavior, not a fundamental flaw in the market itself.

An alternative data point from Equifax reveals significant economic stress. The delinquency rate for subprime auto loans (borrowers with scores below 660) has reached 10%, a level higher than that observed during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis, signaling trouble for lower-income households.

In a highly concerning paradox, delinquency rates for subprime auto loans are now higher than they were during the 2008 financial crisis when unemployment was 10%. This signals extreme stress among lower-income consumers even in a strong labor market.