In large loan portfolios, defaults are not evenly distributed. As seen in a student loan example, the vast majority (90%) of defaults can originate from a specific sub-segment, like for-profit schools, and occur within a predictable timeframe, such as the first 18 months.
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The term "middle market" is too broad for risk assessment. KKR's analysis indicates that default risk and performance dispersion are not uniform. Instead, they will be most pronounced in the lower, smaller end of the middle market, while the larger companies in the upper-middle market remain more resilient.
Large banks have offloaded riskier loans to private credit, which is now more accessible to retail investors. According to Crossmark's Victoria Fernandez, this concentration of risk in a less transparent market, where "cockroaches" may be hiding, is a primary systemic concern.
Identifying flawed investments, especially in opaque markets like private credit, is rarely about one decisive discovery. It involves assembling a 'mosaic' from many small pieces of information and red flags. This gradual build-up of evidence is what allows for an early, profitable exit before negatives become obvious to all.
Default rates are not uniform. High-yield bonds are low due to a 2020 "cleansing." Leveraged loans show elevated defaults due to higher rates. Private credit defaults are masked but may be as high as 6%, indicated by "bad PIK" amendments, suggesting hidden stress.
The most imprudent lending decisions occur during economic booms. Widespread optimism, complacency, and fear of missing out cause investors to lower their standards and overlook risks, sowing the seeds for future failures that are only revealed in a downturn.
Despite headlines blaming private credit for failures like First Brands, the vast majority (over 95%) of the exposure lies with banks and in the liquid credit markets. This narrative overlooks the structural advantages and deeper diligence inherent in private deals.
Recent credit failures and frauds are not 'systemic' risks that threaten the entire financial system's structure. Instead, they are 'systematic'—a regularly recurring behavioral phenomenon. Good times predictably lead to imprudent lending, creating clusters of defaults. The problem is human behavior, not a fundamental flaw in the market itself.
To fix the student debt crisis, universities should be financially on the hook for the first portion of any loan default (e.g., $20,000). This "first loss" position would compel them to underwrite the economic viability of their own degrees, creating a powerful market check against pushing students into overpriced and low-value programs.
Private credit funds have taken massive market share by heavily lending to SaaS companies. This concentration, often 30-40% of public BDC portfolios, now poses a significant, underappreciated risk as AI threatens to disintermediate the cash flows of these legacy software businesses.
The problem isn't that college is inherently bad, but that the U.S. system creates a moral hazard. Government-guaranteed, non-dischargeable loans remove any incentive for universities to be competitive on price or deliver value, allowing them to become "parasitic" organizations that saddle students with crippling debt.
