Robert Kaplan argues that with inflation at 2.75-3%, the neutral Fed funds rate is ~3.5-3.75%. Since the current rate is 3.75-4%, another cut would place policy at neutral, not accommodative. This is a risky position when inflation remains well above the 2% target, leaving no room for error.
The widely expected 25 basis point rate cut was overshadowed by two dissents—one for a larger cut and one for holding rates steady. This internal division, along with four reserve banks requesting no discount rate change, signals significant uncertainty and disagreement within the Fed about the future path of monetary policy.
Technological innovation should naturally cause deflation (falling prices). The Fed's 2% inflation target requires printing enough money to first counteract all technological deflation and then add 2% on top, making the true inflationary effect much larger than officially stated.
Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.
The market is pricing in approximately three more rate cuts for next year, totaling around 110 basis points. However, J.P. Morgan's analysis, supported by the Fed's own dot plot, suggests only one additional cut is likely, indicating that current market pricing for easing is too aggressive.
According to BlackRock's CIO Rick Reeder, the critical metric for the economy isn't the Fed Funds Rate, but a stable 10-year Treasury yield. This stability lowers volatility in the mortgage market, which is far more impactful for real-world borrowing, corporate funding, and international investor confidence.
Even if US inflation remains stubbornly high, the US dollar's potential to appreciate is capped by the Federal Reserve's asymmetric reaction function. The Fed is operating under a risk management framework where it is more inclined to ease on economic weakness than to react hawkishly to firm inflation, limiting terminal rate repricing.
In shallow easing cycles, historical data shows Treasury yields don't bottom on the day of the final rate cut. Instead, they typically hit their low point one to two months prior, signaling a rebound even as the Fed completes its easing actions.
The FOMC's recent rate cut marks the end of preemptive, "risk management" cuts designed to insure against potential future risks. Future policy changes will now be strictly reactive, depending on incoming economic data. This is a critical shift in the Fed's reaction function that changes the calculus for predicting future moves.
Alan Greenspan viewed a rising gold price as a market signal that monetary policy was too loose and interest rates were too low. Today's soaring gold price, viewed through this lens, suggests the Federal Reserve is making a significant policy error by considering rate cuts.
The U.S. government's debt is so large that the Federal Reserve is trapped. Raising interest rates would trigger a government default, while cutting them would further inflate the 'everything bubble.' Either path leads to a systemic crisis, a situation economists call 'fiscal dominance.'