The widely expected 25 basis point rate cut was overshadowed by two dissents—one for a larger cut and one for holding rates steady. This internal division, along with four reserve banks requesting no discount rate change, signals significant uncertainty and disagreement within the Fed about the future path of monetary policy.

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Due to massive government debt, the Fed's tools work paradoxically. Raising rates increases the deficit via higher interest payments, which is stimulative. Cutting rates is also inherently stimulative. The Fed is no longer controlling inflation but merely choosing the path through which it occurs.

According to BlackRock's CIO Rick Reeder, the critical metric for the economy isn't the Fed Funds Rate, but a stable 10-year Treasury yield. This stability lowers volatility in the mortgage market, which is far more impactful for real-world borrowing, corporate funding, and international investor confidence.

When government spending is massive ("fiscal dominance"), the Federal Reserve's ability to manage the economy via interest rates is neutralized. The government's deficit spending is so large that it dictates economic conditions, rendering rate cuts ineffective at solving structural problems.

The Fed's sudden dovish turn, despite admitting no new information was gathered, shows it reacts to immediate pressures like a weakening labor market rather than adhering to long-term inflation targets. This makes its forward guidance unreliable for investors.

The recent widening of long-end swap spreads was driven by expectations for a benchmark rate change and an earlier end to QT. The FOMC meeting disappointed on both fronts, causing spreads to narrow as the specific catalysts priced by the market failed to materialize. This highlights how granular policy expectations drive specific market instruments.

Fed Chair Powell highlighted that annual benchmark revisions to labor data could reveal that the U.S. economy is already shedding jobs, contrary to initial reports. This statistical nuance, creating a "curious balance" with a stable unemployment rate, makes the Fed more inclined to cut rates to manage this underlying uncertainty.

In shallow easing cycles, historical data shows Treasury yields don't bottom on the day of the final rate cut. Instead, they typically hit their low point one to two months prior, signaling a rebound even as the Fed completes its easing actions.

The market's significant reaction was not to the anticipated rate cut, but to Chair Powell's direct press conference statement that a December cut was "not a foregone conclusion. Far from it." This demonstrates how a central bank chair's specific phrasing and communication style can be a more powerful market-moving catalyst than the policy decision itself.

The FOMC's recent rate cut marks the end of preemptive, "risk management" cuts designed to insure against potential future risks. Future policy changes will now be strictly reactive, depending on incoming economic data. This is a critical shift in the Fed's reaction function that changes the calculus for predicting future moves.

The U.S. government's debt is so large that the Federal Reserve is trapped. Raising interest rates would trigger a government default, while cutting them would further inflate the 'everything bubble.' Either path leads to a systemic crisis, a situation economists call 'fiscal dominance.'