Recruiting a highly influential but inaccessible figure is impractical. An effective intelligence strategy is to target individuals in their close circle who have access to the desired information but are far more manageable as sources.

Contrary to spy fiction, the most effective and “crazy” intelligence gathering involves embedding surveillance technology into mundane infrastructure. For instance, building a hijackable, covert cell tower into a tractor that an adversary then purchases and deploys themselves is far more plausible and powerful than planting a tracking device in a tooth.

A sophisticated threat involves state-sponsored actors from the DPRK using AI interview tools and virtual backgrounds to pass hiring processes. They get hired, receive company laptops, and then operate as insider threats, creating a significant and often undetected security risk for organizations.

An 'access agent' is recruited to gain proximity to powerful individuals who cannot be recruited directly. Epstein's role was likely to provide a comfortable environment for targets, gather compromising material (kompromat) via hidden cameras, and leverage that access for intelligence gathering.

An undercover FBI agent approached a Chinese spy not as a threat, but as an ally. By fabricating a story that the spy's handler was arrested and communications were compromised, the agent created a sense of danger and then offered himself as the sole safe channel, effectively isolating and controlling the target.

Beyond official agreements for data access, governments recruit insiders within tech firms. They create informal channels by exploiting personal vulnerabilities, such as offering medical treatment for a family member in exchange for cooperation.

Ubiquitous technological surveillance has rendered traditional spycraft difficult. The new model shifts from case officers managing multiple assets to a resource-intensive focus on securely running a single, exceptionally well-placed spy. The core challenge is now technology, not time management.

The financial incentives of prediction markets create a vulnerability that foreign intelligence services can exploit. Just as the CIA reportedly leveraged China's graft system to recruit sources, adversaries could offer insider tips on market bets to cultivate and compromise individuals within the U.S. national security apparatus.

Sleeper agents are trained from birth in simulated American towns in Russia. To create a legitimate identity, intelligence services take the name and birth date of an infant who died shortly after birth, allowing them to obtain a valid social security card and passport.