Contrary to spy movie tropes, using threats or sextortion is ineffective for recruiting assets. An ex-CIA officer explains that productive intelligence relationships, much like business partnerships, must be based on trust and friendship to yield valuable, long-term information.

Recruiting a highly influential but inaccessible figure is impractical. An effective intelligence strategy is to target individuals in their close circle who have access to the desired information but are far more manageable as sources.

If a country's laws prevent it from spying on a domestic target, it can have a Five Eyes partner (like the UK spying for the US) conduct the operation. The intelligence is then shared back, effectively circumventing national legal restrictions.

Similar to the financial sector, tech companies are increasingly pressured to act as a de facto arm of the government, particularly on issues like censorship. This has led to a power struggle, with some tech leaders now publicly pre-committing to resist future government requests.

Beyond typical IP theft, North Korea runs a program where state-backed operators secure remote tech jobs in Western companies. Their goal is not just espionage but also earning salaries to directly fund the regime, representing a unique and insidious state-sponsored threat.

With digital footprints making simple cover stories obsolete, intelligence agencies now build entire, fully-funded companies to create a plausible pretext for an agent to interact with a high-value target. This provides sophisticated 'cover for action.'

A key vulnerability in international privacy frameworks is the use of loaded terms like 'terrorism' to trigger mutual legal assistance treaties. This tactic pressures foreign governments to comply with data requests they might otherwise scrutinize more heavily, creating a legal 'attack vector.'

The financial incentives of prediction markets create a vulnerability that foreign intelligence services can exploit. Just as the CIA reportedly leveraged China's graft system to recruit sources, adversaries could offer insider tips on market bets to cultivate and compromise individuals within the U.S. national security apparatus.

When trying to access a fortified system, the cheapest vector is human intelligence. Recruiting an insider with loose morals or personal vulnerabilities is typically far more cost-effective than developing a complex technological exploit.