The "PLG Trap" occurs when founders assume moving upmarket is just a pricing change. In reality, shifting from PLG to enterprise sales requires a difficult, company-wide transition across product (e.g., SOC 2 compliance), organization (e.g., sales engineers), and culture.
Even successful PLG companies like Figma eventually burn through their early adopter market. To avoid hitting an asymptotic growth curve, they must proactively build a traditional outbound sales team to tackle the enterprise market before the PLG engine stalls. Don't wait until you need it.
Leaders often misapply successful playbooks from past roles. Instead of force-fitting, they should deconstruct the sales motion from first principles: who is the user, what's already working, and how do they *really* buy in this specific context? This ensures the playbook fits the new company's unique dynamics, especially in a PLG environment.
Founders must consider their sales motion (e.g., PLG vs. enterprise sales-led) when designing the product. A product built for one motion won't sell effectively in another, potentially forcing a costly redesign. This concept extends "product-market fit" to "product-market-sales fit."
Instead of choosing between Product-Led Growth (PLG) and Sales-Led Growth (SLG), companies should treat them as a portfolio. Test both motions and continuously invest where you see incremental ROI, rather than treating them as mutually exclusive strategies.
As Eleven Labs shifted to enterprise, the long 6-12 month sales cycles caused skepticism among its fast-paced PLG teams. To maintain morale, leadership had to actively shield the teams from the lengthy process, asking for trust until the enterprise deals began to materialize and prove the strategy.
Pendo's CPO advocates for a blended approach in enterprise B2B. The product must enable self-service and stand on its own (PLG), but a skilled sales team is crucial for navigating complex procurement, building business cases, and establishing trust with large, regulated customers.
A common PLG pitfall is assuming the user base will naturally springboard into enterprise deals. Often, the enterprise buyer is a different person with different problems. This oversight can cost companies years, as they have to build a second, separate sales motion from scratch.
When Irembo shifted to a platform model, it neglected to update its sales team on new, standardized features. Sales continued fielding custom requests for solved problems and couldn't articulate the platform's full value, revealing a critical sales enablement gap during product-led transitions.
Veteran tech executives argue that evolving a business model is much harder than changing technology. A business model creates a deep "rut" that aligns customers, sales incentives, and legal contracts, making strategic shifts (like moving from licensing to SaaS) incredibly painful and complex to execute.
While many product-led growth companies delay building a sales team, this is often a mistake. Waiting until bottoms-up growth stalls forces a painful "whiplash moment" as the company scrambles to adopt a new GTM motion. Building both motions in parallel creates a more resilient business.