Indian refiners are likely to reduce direct purchases from sanctioned Russian entities like Rosneft. This is driven less by the sanctions themselves and more by the desire to protect their reputation and maintain access to the global financial system. The precedent set with Iran, where official imports dropped to zero, suggests a similar pattern.

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Sanctions on major Russian oil companies don't halt exports but instead push them into opaque channels. Russia uses independent traders and restructured ownership to create "unknown" cargos, removing sanctioned company names from documents. This model, proven with smaller firms, maintains export volumes while obscuring the oil's origin.

A board member's role includes flagging strategic risks, including geopolitical exposure that could drastically limit future acquirers or prevent an IPO. Advising a CEO to relocate teams from a high-risk country is not operational meddling, but a core governance duty.

Russia has dramatically shifted its oil trade away from the U.S. dollar, with only 5% of exports now settled in USD, down from 55% in 2022. While this circumvents direct financial sanctions, Russia remains vulnerable as key logistics like freight and insurance are still dollar-linked, increasing costs and complexity.

The valuation gap between Airwallex ($8B) and Ramp ($32B), which have comparable revenues, demonstrates a tangible "Asia discount." Investors significantly mark down companies with a strong presence or founding nexus in Asia due to perceived geopolitical and data security risks.

Recognizing Russia's high tolerance for military casualties, Ukraine has shifted its strategy to asymmetric economic warfare. By systematically using long-range drones to attack Russian oil refineries and tankers, Ukraine aims to inflict financial pain where the human cost of war has failed to be a deterrent, creating what they call "the real sanctions."

The primary impact of U.S. sanctions on Russian oil is not a reduction in supply but a compression of profit margins. Russia is forced to offer deeper discounts, estimated at $3-$5 per barrel below pre-sanction levels, to compensate buyers for increased logistical and financial risks, ensuring export flows remain stable.

Each time the U.S. uses financial sanctions, it demonstrates the risks of relying on the dollar system. This incentivizes adversaries like Russia and China to accelerate the development of parallel financial infrastructure, weakening the dollar's long-term network effect and dominance.

In Russia, nominally private companies like Gazprom function as direct extensions of the state. Their international investments are designed not just for profit but to achieve geopolitical goals, creating a system where foreign policy, business interests, and the personal wealth of the ruling class are completely inseparable.

When trade policies force allies like Canada to find new partners, it's not a temporary shift. They build new infrastructure and relationships that won't be abandoned even if the political climate changes. The trust is broken, making the economic damage long-lasting and difficult to repair.

Geopolitical shifts mean a company's country of origin heavily influences its market access and tariff burdens. This "corporate nationality" creates an uneven playing field, where a business's location can instantly become a massive advantage or liability compared to competitors.