Venezuela's remaining leadership can adopt a strategy of "playing for time." By appearing cooperative while delaying substantive changes, they can wait for events like the US midterms to increase domestic political pressure on the administration, making sustained intervention unpopular and difficult to maintain. The weaker state's best defense is the superpower's internal clock.
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Political gridlock is portrayed as an intentional strategy. By creating a temporary economic downturn via a shutdown, the administration creates fiscal and monetary space to inject massive stimulus leading into midterm elections, timing the recovery for political gain.
According to Maria Corina Machado, Nicolás Maduro's rise to power was not an internal decision but a direct choice by the Cuban government. Having been trained in Cuba and demonstrating total loyalty to the Castro regime, Maduro was selected to ensure Cuba's continued influence and control over Venezuela.
The raid on Maduro is presented as an opportunity for special forces units to demonstrate their value to an administration wary of large, troop-intensive occupations. This "surgical strike" model offers a politically palatable alternative to the costly nation-building efforts of the 2000s in Iraq and Afghanistan.
A political party might intentionally trigger a government shutdown not to win policy concessions, but to create a public narrative of a dysfunctional opposition. The true victory isn't legislative but reputational, aiming to sway voters in upcoming elections by making the ruling party look incompetent.
The Trump administration is depicted as ignoring Venezuela's legitimately elected opposition leader and instead choosing to work with the former vice president. This suggests a strategy prioritizing controllable stability with a regime figure over supporting a democratically elected but potentially less predictable leader.
The "absolutely clinical" US raid to capture Venezuela's president is lauded as a military success. However, historical precedents from Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 show that initial military prowess in toppling a regime is no guarantee of long-term strategic success, which depends on far more complex political factors.
Contrary to the assumption that U.S. military action is unwelcome in the region, polling reveals significant support. 53% of Latin Americans and 64% of the Venezuelan diaspora would back an intervention to remove Nicolas Maduro, highlighting a major disconnect with the skepticism of the American public.
The conflict is not primarily about oil or drugs, but a strategic move to reassert U.S. dominance in the Western Hemisphere. As China solidifies its influence in the East, the U.S. is 'drawing a line' to counter China's partnerships (like with Venezuela) in its own sphere of influence.
Geopolitical adversaries with long-term leadership, like Iran, view the U.S.'s frequent changes in administration as a temporary inconvenience rather than a fundamental policy shift. They see the U.S. as an "obnoxious guy on the bus" whom they can simply ignore and outlast by staying their course.
The recent uptick in global conflicts, from Ukraine to the Caribbean, is not a series of isolated events. It's a direct result of adversaries perceiving American weakness and acting on the historical principle that nations expand their influence until they are met with sufficient counter-force.
