Benchmark Partner Ev Randall argues that large, multi-billion dollar VC funds struggle to generate the high-multiple returns (e.g., 5x net) that LPs seek from venture capital. He claims the sheer size of these funds "defies the laws of physics," positioning smaller, more constrained funds like Benchmark as better able to deliver traditional venture-like returns.
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There's a surprising disconnect between the perceived brilliance of individual investors at large, well-known private equity firms and their actual net-to-LP returns, which are often no better than the market median. This violates the assumption that top talent automatically generates outlier results.
Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
Applying Conway's Law to venture, a firm's strategy is dictated by its fund size and team structure. A $7B fund must participate in mega-rounds to deploy capital effectively, while a smaller fund like Benchmark is structured to pursue astronomical money-on-money returns from earlier stages, making mega-deals strategically illogical.
The primary risk to a VC fund's performance isn't its absolute size but rather a dramatic increase (e.g., doubling) from one fund to the next. This forces firms to change their strategy and write larger checks than their conviction muscle is built for.
Botha argues venture capital isn't a scalable asset class. Despite massive capital inflows (~$250B/year), the number of significant ($1B+) exits hasn't increased from ~20 per year. The math for industry-wide returns doesn't work, making it a "return-free risk" for many LPs.
Contrary to the belief that smaller VC funds generate higher multiples, a16z's data shows their larger funds can outperform. This is driven by the massive expansion of private markets, where significant value is now created in later growth stages (Series C and beyond).
The majority of venture capital funds fail to return capital, with a 60% loss-making base rate. This highlights that VC is a power-law-driven asset class. The key to success is not picking consistently good funds, but ensuring access to the tiny fraction of funds that generate extraordinary, outlier returns.
David George of Andreessen Horowitz reveals that contrary to the belief that smaller funds yield higher multiples, a16z's best-performing fund is a $1B vehicle. This success is driven by capturing enough ownership in massive winners like Databricks and Coinbase, demonstrating that fund size can be an advantage in today's market where value creation extends into later private stages.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.
Mega-funds like a16z operate on a different model than smaller VCs. They provide Limited Partners with diversified, almost guaranteed access to every major tech company, prioritizing strong absolute dollar returns over the high multiples sought from smaller, more concentrated funds.
