The oil industry's boom-bust cycle is self-perpetuating. Low prices cause companies to slash investment and lead to a talent drain as workers leave the volatile sector. This underinvestment, combined with natural production declines, inevitably leads to tighter markets and price spikes years later.

Asian refineries, facing a potential cutoff of crude from the Strait of Hormuz, are reducing processing rates to prolong operations. This immediate reduction in the supply of refined products like jet fuel causes their prices to spike before the full impact of the crude oil shortage is felt globally.

The 20 million barrels of oil flowing daily through the Strait of Hormuz represent 20% of global supply. A blockade constitutes a disruption four times larger than the Iranian Revolution or Yom Kippur War embargoes, with no simple replacement.

Despite healthy global oil demand, J.P. Morgan maintains a bearish outlook because supply is forecast to expand at three times the rate of demand. This oversupply creates such a large market imbalance that prices must fall to enforce production cuts and rebalance the market.

Contrary to bearish sentiment, oil demand has consistently exceeded expectations. The market's weakness stems from a supply glut, primarily from the Americas, which has outpaced demand growth by more than twofold, leading to a structural surplus and significant inventory builds.

The impact of an oil supply disruption on price is a convex function of its duration. A short-term closure results in delayed deliveries with minimal price effect, while a prolonged one exhausts storage and requires triple-digit prices to force demand destruction and rebalance the market.

The halt in oil refining cripples the supply of essential byproducts. This includes sulfur (needed for mining and batteries), liquefied natural gas (powering TSMC's chip fabs), and nitrogen fertilizer feedstock. This creates cascading civilizational-level risks far beyond the gas pump.

The global LNG system operates near full capacity. When a major supplier (representing 17% of the market) goes offline, there are no significant alternative suppliers. The only mechanism for the market to rebalance is through high prices forcing demand destruction in importing nations.

While global spare oil capacity exists as a buffer, it is heavily concentrated in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. During a conflict, if the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed, this capacity becomes physically trapped and cannot be deployed to global markets, nullifying its role as a price stabilizer.