Every 10 days the Strait of Hormuz is closed, a 200-million-barrel physical gap is created in the global oil flow. This is not a temporary kink but a massive hole in the supply chain that will take months to resolve and normalize, even long after transit resumes.

The 20 million barrels of oil flowing daily through the Strait of Hormuz represent 20% of global supply. A blockade constitutes a disruption four times larger than the Iranian Revolution or Yom Kippur War embargoes, with no simple replacement.

The recent surge in oil prices to $78 per barrel is not just vague fear. Analyst models suggest the market has priced in an $8-13 risk premium, which corresponds directly to the expected impact of a complete, four-week closure of the Strait of Hormuz, providing a concrete measure of market sentiment.

The Middle East conflict has moved beyond risk to a physical blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. With commercial tankers no longer transiting, nearly 20% of global oil is cut off from markets. This supply disruption, not just a risk premium, is driving oil prices toward $100/barrel.

The impact of an oil supply disruption on price is a convex function of its duration. A short-term closure results in delayed deliveries with minimal price effect, while a prolonged one exhausts storage and requires triple-digit prices to force demand destruction and rebalance the market.

The halt in oil refining cripples the supply of essential byproducts. This includes sulfur (needed for mining and batteries), liquefied natural gas (powering TSMC's chip fabs), and nitrogen fertilizer feedstock. This creates cascading civilizational-level risks far beyond the gas pump.

The conflict's primary impact on oil is not that supply is offline, but that its transport through the Strait of Hormuz is blocked. This distinction is key to understanding price scenarios, as supply exists but cannot be delivered.

Even if global Strategic Petroleum Reserves (SPRs) were unlimited, their collective maximum release rate is far less than the 20 million barrels per day that flow through the Strait of Hormuz. This physical constraint means SPRs can only soften the blow, not solve the supply crisis, making early release critical.

While global spare oil capacity exists as a buffer, it is heavily concentrated in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait. During a conflict, if the Strait of Hormuz is effectively closed, this capacity becomes physically trapped and cannot be deployed to global markets, nullifying its role as a price stabilizer.