Once Chinese intervention in the Korean War created a stalemate, Stalin saw the conflict as a perfect opportunity. He believed it would drain American resources and delay China's rise, all while keeping Russia out of direct conflict—a low-risk, high-reward strategy of "fighting to the last Chinese."

Historically, murderous ideologies like those of Mao and Stalin gained traction by hiding behind benevolent promises ('free stuff'). This benign messaging makes them more deceptively dangerous than overtly aggressive ideologies like Nazism, which clearly signal their malevolence and are thus easier for the public to identify and reject.

The US foreign policy establishment is not driven by partisan ideology but by strategic interests. It will fund contradictory groups—from right-wing Ukrainian nationalists to progressive artists—if they serve the immediate goal of destabilizing a region to secure economic or military advantages.

Rather than taking a "holier than thou" stance and refusing to engage with governments that have committed atrocities, it is more effective to build bridges. Cooperation invites them into the 21st century and aligns them with your values, whereas isolationism is counterproductive.

For generations, Western societies have viewed peace and prosperity as the default state. This perception is a historical outlier, making the return to 'dog eat dog' great power politics seem shocking, when in fact it's a reversion to the historical norm of conflict.

In global conflicts, a nation's power dictates its actions and outcomes, not moral righteousness. History shows powerful nations, like the U.S. using nuclear weapons, operate beyond conventional moral constraints, making an understanding of power dynamics more critical than moralizing.

Holding out for morally perfect leaders is naive and paralyzing. The reality of geopolitics is a "knife fight" where leaders inevitably make decisions that result in death. Progress requires working with these flawed individuals rather than disengaging over past actions.

An ideologue, even an anarchist advocating against the state, may support a massive state action if it serves a higher strategic purpose—in this case, disrupting a system they oppose. The perceived hypocrisy is dismissed as irrelevant when compared to the desired outcome, framing it as a solution, not a preferred method of governance.

Fearing a joint German-Japanese attack in the 1930s, Stalin used his influence to force Chinese Nationalists and Communists into a united front. This provoked Japan into a massive, costly invasion of China in 1937, tying down Japanese forces so they could not threaten the Soviet Union.