The same governments pushing AI competition for a strategic edge may be forced into cooperation. As AI democratizes access to catastrophic weapons (CBRN), the national security risk will become so great that even rival superpowers will have a mutual incentive to create verifiable safety treaties.
While U.S. advocates for AI cooperation with China often feel they are in a marginalized minority fighting a hawkish narrative, their counterparts in China feel their position is mainstream. Chinese academia, industry, and think tanks broadly view international governance collaboration as a priority, not just an acceptable option.
Top Chinese officials use the metaphor "if the braking system isn't under control, you can't really step on the accelerator with confidence." This reflects a core belief that robust safety measures enable, rather than hinder, the aggressive development and deployment of powerful AI systems, viewing the two as synergistic.
The justification for accelerating AI development to beat China is logically flawed. It assumes the victor wields a controllable tool. In reality, both nations are racing to build the same uncontrollable AI, making the race itself, not the competitor, the primary existential threat.
For a blueprint on AI governance, look to Cold War-era geopolitics, not just tech history. The 1967 UN Outer Space Treaty, which established cooperation between the US and Soviet Union, shows that global compromise on new frontiers is possible even amidst intense rivalry. It provides a model for political, not just technical, solutions.
The development of AI won't stop because of game theory. For competing nations like the US and China, the risk of falling behind is greater than the collective risk of developing the technology. This dynamic makes the AI race an unstoppable force, mirroring the Cold War nuclear arms race and rendering calls for a pause futile.
In China, academics have significant influence on policymaking, partly due to a cultural tradition that highly values scholars. Experts deeply concerned about existential AI risks have briefed the highest levels of government, suggesting that policy may be less susceptible to capture by commercial tech interests compared to the West.
The argument that the U.S. must race to build superintelligence before China is flawed. The Chinese Communist Party's primary goal is control. An uncontrollable AI poses a direct existential threat to their power, making them more likely to heavily regulate or halt its development rather than recklessly pursue it.
The belief that AI development is unstoppable ignores history. Global treaties successfully limited nuclear proliferation, phased out ozone-depleting CFCs, and banned blinding lasers. These precedents prove that coordinated international action can steer powerful technologies away from the worst outcomes.
Public fear focuses on AI hypothetically creating new nuclear weapons. The more immediate danger is militaries trusting highly inaccurate AI systems for critical command and control decisions over existing nuclear arsenals, where even a small error rate could be catastrophic.
An FDA-style regulatory model would force AI companies to make a quantitative safety case for their models before deployment. This shifts the burden of proof from regulators to creators, creating powerful financial incentives for labs to invest heavily in safety research, much like pharmaceutical companies invest in clinical trials.