Apple insisted all card statements be sent on the first of the month to enhance customer experience. This forced Goldman Sachs to staff a massive, costly customer service team that was overwhelmed at the start of the month and idle for the remainder, unlike the staggered billing used by other banks.

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To prevent its suppliers from going bankrupt if contracts were cut, Apple mandated that no supplier could be more than 50% dependent on its business. This forced highly-trained manufacturers to find other customers, directly enabling the rise of sophisticated Chinese smartphone brands like Huawei and Xiaomi.

Unlike typical co-branded credit card portfolios that sell for a premium, Goldman Sachs offloaded the Apple Card's debt to JPMorgan at a significant loss. This underscores the program's unprofitability, driven by high defaults and operational costs, despite the prestigious Apple brand.

Regulation E, a 1979 law, legally mandates that financial institutions bear liability for unauthorized electronic fund transfers. This forces banks to create robust, consumer-friendly dispute systems like chargebacks, making them appear responsive when they are simply complying with strict federal rules that protect consumers.

Goldman Sachs is divesting consumer-facing businesses like Marcus and its credit card to refocus on high-margin corporate advisory. Its stock is at an all-time high, validating a strategy where earning a small percentage (e.g., 0.2%) on multi-billion dollar transactions is far more profitable than serving millions of smaller retail customers.

Steve Jobs' vision of Apple as an inclusive brand conflicted with the necessary exclusivity of credit risk assessment. This led to lower underwriting standards (credit scores around 600) for the Apple Card, contributing to its poor performance and eventual sale by Goldman Sachs at a discount.

The consumer partnership with Apple represented less than 5% of Goldman Sachs's revenue but received disproportionate negative attention. The leadership team made the tough call to exit because the strategic distraction and damage to the firm's narrative outweighed its actual financial impact.

Companies intentionally create friction ("sludge")—like long waits and complex processes—not from incompetence, but to discourage customers from pursuing claims or services they are entitled to. This is the insidious counterpart to behavioral "nudge" theory.

When customers engage in irrational behavior, like setting impossible deadlines, it's often a calculated, long-term strategy to manipulate internal systems. One manager documented missed deadlines not to enforce them, but to build a case for more resources from his superiors.

After Citibank accidentally sent $900 million to Revlon's lenders, a new clause called the "erroneous payment deal term" emerged. This term is now in 90% of credit deals, illustrating how a single, high-profile operational failure can rapidly create a new, non-negotiable market standard for risk mitigation.

To mitigate its own risk, Apple's "50% rule" required suppliers to find other customers. This policy forced them to share advanced manufacturing processes co-developed with Apple, directly enabling the rise of Chinese smartphone rivals like Xiaomi and Huawei.