To prevent its suppliers from going bankrupt if contracts were cut, Apple mandated that no supplier could be more than 50% dependent on its business. This forced highly-trained manufacturers to find other customers, directly enabling the rise of sophisticated Chinese smartphone brands like Huawei and Xiaomi.
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After facing political attacks, Apple realized its retail sales were not its main leverage with Beijing. Its real power was its massive, multi-billion dollar investment in training hundreds of local suppliers. This positioned Apple as the single largest contributor to China's high-end electronics capabilities, a key government priority.
Instead of a total ban, a more strategic approach is to "slow ball" an adversary like China by providing them with just enough technology. This keeps them dependent on foreign suppliers and disincentivizes the massive state investment required to develop their own superior, independent solutions.
Counterintuitively, U.S. and global auto firms need to collaborate with Chinese suppliers to reduce strategic dependency. The model involves onshoring Chinese hardware and manufacturing expertise while maintaining national control over sensitive AI software and networks, creating a strategic "co-opetition."
Apple's deep reliance on China is not just about cost but a 25-year investment in a manufacturing ecosystem that can produce complex products at immense scale and quality. Replicating this unique combination in India or elsewhere is considered fanciful.
While China bans many US tech giants, it welcomed Tesla. A compelling theory suggests this was a strategic move to observe and learn Tesla's methods for mass-producing EVs at scale, thereby accelerating the development of domestic champions like BYD, mirroring its past strategy with Apple's iPhone.
Apple wasn't a visionary in offshoring; it was a laggard. Its move to China was driven by the inability to manufacture the radically different iMac, a product designed to save the company. This desperation forced it to abandon its long-held control over manufacturing and partner with Asian suppliers.
The common practice of offshoring manufacturing, exemplified by Apple, creates a critical flaw by severing the feedback loop between designers and producers. This leads to suboptimal product design and simultaneously transfers advanced manufacturing skills and capabilities to other nations, like China.
Terry Guo of Foxconn pursued a partnership with a struggling Apple, recognizing that learning from Apple's demanding standards was more valuable than short-term profits. He understood Apple's uniqueness better than Apple did, betting that mastering their complexity would make Foxconn capable of serving any client.
To mitigate its own risk, Apple's "50% rule" required suppliers to find other customers. This policy forced them to share advanced manufacturing processes co-developed with Apple, directly enabling the rise of Chinese smartphone rivals like Xiaomi and Huawei.
U.S. export controls on advanced semiconductors, intended to slow China, have instead galvanized its domestic industry. The restrictions accelerated China's existing push for self-sufficiency, forcing local companies to innovate with less advanced chips and develop their own GPU and manufacturing capabilities, diminishing the policy's long-term effectiveness.
