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Sophisticated public market investors scrutinize stock-based compensation (SBC) as a percentage of revenue. When this figure gets high (e.g., Snowflake at 35%), it signals poor corporate governance and dilution, deterring institutional investment.

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Michael Burry's thesis is that aggressive stock-based compensation (SBC) at companies like Nvidia significantly distorts their valuations. By treating SBC as a true owner's cost, a stock appearing to trade at 30 times earnings might actually be closer to 60 times, mirroring dot-com era accounting concerns.

Many tech stocks appear cheaper after market corrections, but massive stock-based compensation (SBC) creates significant, ongoing shareholder dilution. This hidden cost means the underlying businesses are not as inexpensive on a fundamental basis as their stock prices suggest.

Snap's valuation languishes despite a massive user base because of its extreme stock-based compensation ($2.5B in 12 months). This financial tactic inflates adjusted profits while massively diluting shareholders, revealing a fundamental disconnect between user growth and actual investor value creation.

In sharp contrast to most US tech firms, Kaspi's stock-based compensation is less than 0.5% of its revenue. This means the share count remains flat over time without requiring costly buybacks, directly benefiting long-term shareholders.

Despite having a billion monthly active users and positive adjusted EBITDA, Snap's stock is near all-time lows. The primary reason highlighted is its staggering $2.5 billion in stock-based compensation over the last year, which severely dilutes shareholder value and raises concerns about its financial discipline.

Software's heavy reliance on stock-based compensation (13.8% of revenue vs. 1.1% in other sectors) distorts key valuation metrics. The cash spent on share buybacks to offset dilution isn't factored into free cash flow calculations, making software companies appear more profitable than they are.

When a SaaS company's stock falls 90%, its stock-based compensation (stock comp) becomes untenable. A company previously valued at $1B paying $100M in stock comp (10% dilution) is now a $100M company paying the same amount, creating 50%+ annual dilution that is unacceptable to investors and employees alike.

For companies like Sprout Social, high stock compensation becomes unsustainable after a major stock decline. To maintain compensation value, the company must issue exponentially more shares, creating a death spiral that forces a change in strategy, often spurred by an activist investor or a sale.

Widespread use of non-GAAP metrics that exclude stock-based compensation (SBC) creates a misleading picture of profitability. In reality, many SaaS firms have minimal GAAP earnings, meaning there's no fundamental 'floor' for value investors to step in and buy during a market panic.

The market has fundamentally reset how it values mature SaaS companies. No longer priced on revenue growth, they are now treated like industrial firms. The valuation bottom is only found when they trade at free cash flow multiples that fully account for stock-based compensation.