Michael Burry's thesis is that aggressive stock-based compensation (SBC) at companies like Nvidia significantly distorts their valuations. By treating SBC as a true owner's cost, a stock appearing to trade at 30 times earnings might actually be closer to 60 times, mirroring dot-com era accounting concerns.
Major tech companies are investing in their own customers, creating a self-reinforcing loop of capital that inflates demand and valuations. This dangerous practice mirrors the vendor financing tactics of the dot-com era (e.g., Nortel), which led to a systemic collapse when external capital eventually dried up.
Traditional valuation models assume growth decays over time. However, when a company at scale, like Databricks, begins to reaccelerate, it defies these models. This rare phenomenon signals an expanding market or competitive advantage, justifying massive valuation premiums that seem disconnected from public comps.
Today's massive AI company valuations are based on market sentiment ("vibes") and debt-fueled speculation, not fundamentals, just like the 1999 internet bubble. The market will likely crash when confidence breaks, long before AI's full potential is realized, wiping out many companies but creating immense wealth for those holding the survivors.
Official financial segments often reflect bureaucracy, not true business economics. By creating a 'Shadow P&L' through deductive analysis, investors can uncover massive hidden costs in non-core initiatives, as ValueAct did with Microsoft's hardware divisions.
Current AI investment patterns mirror the "round-tripping" seen in the late '90s tech bubble. For example, NVIDIA invests billions in a startup like OpenAI, which then uses that capital to purchase NVIDIA chips. This creates an illusion of demand and inflated valuations, masking the lack of real, external customer revenue.
The debate over AI chip depreciation highlights a flaw in traditional accounting. GAAP was designed for physical assets with predictable lifecycles, not for digital infrastructure like GPUs whose value creation is dynamic. This mismatch leads to accusations of financial manipulation where firms are simply following outdated rules.
Companies like Tesla and Oracle achieve massive valuations not through profits, but by capturing the dominant market story, such as becoming an "AI company." Investors should analyze a company's ability to create and own the next compelling narrative.
Swisher draws a direct parallel between NVIDIA and Cisco. While NVIDIA is profitable selling AI chips, its customers are not. She predicts major tech players will develop their own chips, eroding NVIDIA's unsustainable valuation, just as the market for routers consolidated and crashed Cisco's stock.
While AI investment has exploded, US productivity has barely risen. Valuations are priced as if a societal transformation is complete, yet 95% of GenAI pilots fail to positively impact company P&Ls. This gap between market expectation and real-world economic benefit creates systemic risk.
Michael Burry, known for predicting the 2008 crash, argues the AI bubble isn't about the technology's potential but about the massive capital expenditure on infrastructure (chips, data centers) that he believes far outpaces actual end-user demand and economic utility.