A staggering 56-58% of middle-market companies brought to market annually for the past three years did not sell, a dramatic increase from the historical average of 10%. This statistic reveals a massive and persistent valuation gap between what sellers expect and what buyers are willing to pay.
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A vast majority of small-to-medium enterprises are priced at valuations their market will not support. This market failure means 8 or 9 out of 10 of these businesses never get sold, trapping their owners—often Baby Boomers—into working long past their desired retirement age.
PE firms are struggling to sell assets acquired in 2020-21, causing distributions to plummet from 30% to 10% annually. This cash crunch prevents investors from re-upping into new funds, shrinking the pool of capital and further depressing the PE-to-PE exit market, trapping investor money.
Accepting too high a valuation can be a fatal error. The first question in any subsequent fundraising or M&A discussion will be about the prior round's price. An unjustifiably high number immediately destroys the psychology of the new deal, making it nearly impossible to raise more capital or sell the company, regardless of progress.
The private equity market has abundant capital and willing companies, yet transactions are stalled. This is because General Partners (GPs) fear selling at low returns and Limited Partners (LPs) fear over-commitment due to liquidity concerns, creating a gridlock where no one wants to act.
GPs are holding assets longer not just due to market conditions, but out of fear for their own business. They believe extending the hold period will allow underlying business growth to eventually hit their crucial Multiple on Invested Capital (MOIC) targets, which is critical for successfully raising their next fund.
Contrary to the narrative that PE firms create leaner, more efficient companies, the data reveals a starkly different reality. The debt-loading and cost-cutting tactics inherent in the PE model dramatically increase a portfolio company's risk of failure.
An estimated 15-20% of all private equity "distributions" in the last two years were not traditional sales or IPOs, but "inorganic" transactions like continuation funds and NAV loans. This means the actual yield from organic, market-driven exits is even lower than the already-dismal headline numbers suggest.
Howard Marks highlights a critical issue in private equity: a massive overhang of portfolio companies needing to be sold to return capital. Higher interest rates have made exits difficult, creating a liquidity bottleneck that slows distributions to LPs and commitments to new funds.
To generate returns on a $10B acquisition, a PE firm needs a $25B exit, which often means an IPO. They must underwrite this IPO at a discount to public comps, despite having paid a 30% premium to acquire the company, creating a significant initial value gap to overcome from day one.
Institutional investors are increasingly allocating capital to the mid-market, and for good reason. Data from the last decade shows top-quartile mid-market sponsors have outperformed their large-cap counterparts by an average of 7.2% per year, a compelling driver for the strategic shift in institutional focus.