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It's naive to expect private companies to reverse the offshoring of chip manufacturing, a trend they initiated to maximize profits. Pat Gelsinger argues that markets don't price in long-term geopolitical risk, making substantial, long-term government industrial policy essential to bring supply chains back.
Pat Gelsinger advocates for a US sovereign wealth fund to counter China's tech investments and secure national priorities. Instead of debt-financing, this fund would use investment capital to target critical, long-term areas like semiconductors, rare earth minerals, and energy, ensuring both financial returns and national resilience.
Current US policy is reactive, fixing compromised supply chains like semiconductors. A proactive 'offensive' strategy would identify nascent, critical industries (e.g., humanoid robotics) and build the entire supply chain domestically from the start, securing a long-term economic and national security advantage.
The current trade friction is part of a larger, long-term bipartisan U.S. strategy of "competitive confrontation." This involves not just tariffs but also significant domestic investment, like the CHIPS Act, to build resilient supply chains and reduce reliance on China for critical industries, a trend expected to persist across administrations.
A U.S. national security document's phrase, "the future belongs to makers," signals a significant policy shift. Credit and tax incentives will likely be redirected from financial engineering (e.g., leveraged buyouts in private equity) to tangible industrial production in order to build resilient, non-Chinese supply chains.
Arm's CEO argues the US has lost its 'muscle memory' for 24/7 manufacturing. The core issue is cultural: manufacturing isn't seen as a prestigious career, unlike in Taiwan where working for TSMC is highly esteemed. This cultural gap is a major hurdle for onshoring efforts.
Government intervention is most effective when targeting industries that meet three criteria: they must be critical to national security or the economy, compromised by foreign dependence or choke points, and fundamentally changeable through targeted financial incentives that can shift their long-term economics.
The U.S. focus on building domestic fabrication plants (fabs) is misguided because fabs represent a lower value-added, highly capital-intensive part of the semiconductor value chain. National security and economic strategy would be better served by focusing on downstream activities like testing and packaging, which are closer to the end consumer.
To rebuild its industrial base at speed, the US government must abandon its typical strategy of funding many small players. Instead, it should identify and place huge bets on a handful of trusted, patriotic entrepreneurs, giving them the scale, offtake agreements, and backing necessary to compete globally.
Contrary to political rhetoric, Siemens' CEO provides a ground-level view that a widespread return of manufacturing to the US has not yet materialized. He cites labor shortages and policy uncertainty as key drags, despite real investments in specific sectors like pharma and semiconductors.
The US semiconductor industry's decline wasn't a deliberate government decision, but a slow migration driven by financial markets. Investors prioritized capital-light software with quick returns over capital-intensive chip manufacturing, which has a 5-8 year profitability timeline.