Emil Michael warns defense tech founders that a prototype is not enough. The Department of War requires a credible plan for mass production. Startups must prove they have mastered the "skilled manufacturing piece" to win large contracts.

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To attract innovation, the DoD is shifting its procurement process. Instead of issuing rigid, 300-page requirement documents that favor incumbents, it now defines a problem and asks companies to propose their own novel solutions.

To prevent promising startups from failing from funding gaps—the "Valley of Death"—the DoD actively "crowds capital" around them. This stack includes rapid R&D contracts, manufacturing grants, and low-cost loans from a $200B lending authority.

Unlike software, where customer acquisition is the main risk, the primary diligence question for transformative hardware is technical feasibility. If a team can prove they can build the product (e.g., a cheaper missile system), the market demand is often a given, simplifying the investment thesis.

US Under Secretary of War Emil Michael reveals that the procurement system was so broken that SpaceX, Anduril, and Palantir all had to sue the Department of War to secure their first contracts, a barrier he is now working to eliminate.

Luckey reveals that Anduril prioritized institutional engagement over engineering in its early days, initially hiring more lawyers and lobbyists. The biggest challenge wasn't building the technology, but convincing the Department of Defense and political stakeholders to believe in a new procurement model, proving that shaping the system is a prerequisite for success.

The government's procurement process often defaults to bidding out projects to established players like Lockheed Martin, even if a startup presents a breakthrough. Success requires navigating this bureaucratic reality, not just superior engineering.

The push to build defense systems in America reveals that critical sub-components, like rocket motors or high-powered amplifiers, are no longer manufactured domestically at scale. This forces new defense companies to vertically integrate and build their own factories, essentially rebuilding parts of the industrial base themselves.

The US defense industry's error was creating a separate, "exquisite" industrial base. The solution is designing weapons that can be built using existing, scalable commercial manufacturing techniques, mirroring the successful approach used during World War II.

Private capital is more efficient for defense R&D than government grants, which involve burdensome oversight. Startups thrive when the government commits to buying finished products rather than funding prototypes, allowing VCs to manage the risk and de-burdening small companies.

Many defense startups fail despite superior technology because the government isn't ready to purchase at scale. Anduril's success hinges on identifying when the customer is ready to adopt new capabilities within a 3-5 year window, making market timing its most critical decision factor.