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The Court's "Hamilton exception" is based on a flawed premise. Hamilton advocated for a private, investor-owned commercial bank, not a government regulatory body. Therefore, the historical analogy used to protect the Fed from presidential power is fundamentally incorrect.

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Monetary policy and bank regulation are two sides of the same coin. Since private banks create money through lending, any regulatory action (like changing capital requirements) directly influences the money supply. Giving the executive branch control over regulation would undermine an independent monetary policy.

The concept of 'Fed independence' has a narrow, critical meaning: the sitting government cannot dictate monetary policy. It does not mean the Fed is unaccountable. This separation is based on empirical evidence from countries without it, where political pressure on interest rates consistently leads to runaway inflation.

Although the decision protecting the Fed was 5-4, only two justices (Roberts and Kavanaugh) actually support the underlying legal logic. The three liberal justices joined to save the outcome while dissenting on the principle, making the Fed's special status highly unstable.

Central bank independence is a relatively new concept from the 1990s. Historically, central banks operated as junior partners to the government, executing industrial policy. The move to subordinate the Fed to the Treasury is a return to a long-standing historical model.

Despite its perceived importance, the Federal Reserve Act offered weaker legal protection against presidential removal than other independent agencies. Its independence was upheld more by norms and tradition than by explicit statutory language.

The "history and tradition" test, originally developed for Second Amendment cases like U.S. v. Rahimi, was unexpectedly applied to create a special exception for the Federal Reserve's independence, while simultaneously dismantling it for other agencies.

The arguments to allow presidential firing of FTC commissioners create a slippery slope that threatens other independent, multi-member bodies. This logic could extend to the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, potentially politicizing U.S. monetary policy—an outcome so significant that even the court's conservative justices appear wary of its implications.

The idea of an independent Fed is a relatively modern concept, dating effectively to 1951. Historically, from its creation in 1913, the Fed has consistently acted as an arm of the state, financing wars and executing government policy, making the current shift towards explicit statecraft a return to its roots.

Despite talk of independence, the Fed is constrained by massive US debt. Any chair, regardless of ideology, will be forced to intervene to prevent a Treasury market collapse, as there isn't enough private balance sheet to finance deficits without the Fed's help.

Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.

The Supreme Court Misinterprets Alexander Hamilton to Justify the Fed's Independence | RiffOn