The concept of 'Fed independence' has a narrow, critical meaning: the sitting government cannot dictate monetary policy. It does not mean the Fed is unaccountable. This separation is based on empirical evidence from countries without it, where political pressure on interest rates consistently leads to runaway inflation.

The Court's "Hamilton exception" is based on a flawed premise. Hamilton advocated for a private, investor-owned commercial bank, not a government regulatory body. Therefore, the historical analogy used to protect the Fed from presidential power is fundamentally incorrect.

Central bank independence is a relatively new concept from the 1990s. Historically, central banks operated as junior partners to the government, executing industrial policy. The move to subordinate the Fed to the Treasury is a return to a long-standing historical model.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

Despite its perceived importance, the Federal Reserve Act offered weaker legal protection against presidential removal than other independent agencies. Its independence was upheld more by norms and tradition than by explicit statutory language.

The "history and tradition" test, originally developed for Second Amendment cases like U.S. v. Rahimi, was unexpectedly applied to create a special exception for the Federal Reserve's independence, while simultaneously dismantling it for other agencies.

The arguments to allow presidential firing of FTC commissioners create a slippery slope that threatens other independent, multi-member bodies. This logic could extend to the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, potentially politicizing U.S. monetary policy—an outcome so significant that even the court's conservative justices appear wary of its implications.

Unlike past presidents who merely expressed opinions on policy, the current administration has used lawsuits and subpoenas against sitting Fed officials. This aggressive legal strategy represents a significant escalation and a direct assault on the institution's operational independence, going far beyond typical political pressure.

The idea of an independent Fed is a relatively modern concept, dating effectively to 1951. Historically, from its creation in 1913, the Fed has consistently acted as an arm of the state, financing wars and executing government policy, making the current shift towards explicit statecraft a return to its roots.