Increasing political influence, including presidential pressure and politically-aligned board appointments, is compromising the Federal Reserve's independence. This suggests future monetary policy may be more dovish than economic data warrants, as the Fed is pushed to prioritize short-term growth ahead of elections.

The post-Powell Fed is likely to reverse the QE playbook. The strategy will involve aggressive rate cuts to lower the cost of capital, combined with deregulation (like SLR exemptions) to incentivize commercial banks to take over money creation. This marks a fundamental shift from central bank-led liquidity to private sector-led credit expansion.

Only the Fed and commercial banks can create new, spendable money out of thin air. In contrast, credit creation, like in shadow banking, simply reallocates existing money from a saver to a spender. This distinction is crucial for understanding economic stimulus and risk.

Rajan argues that a central bank's independence is not guaranteed by its structure but by the political consensus supporting it. When political polarization increases, institutions like the Fed become vulnerable to pressure, as their supposed autonomy is only as strong as the political will to uphold it.

The arguments to allow presidential firing of FTC commissioners create a slippery slope that threatens other independent, multi-member bodies. This logic could extend to the Federal Reserve's Board of Governors, potentially politicizing U.S. monetary policy—an outcome so significant that even the court's conservative justices appear wary of its implications.

The Federal Reserve's power extends beyond setting interest rates to controlling the nation's core financial infrastructure. This supervisory power could be weaponized by a politicized board in ways that don't directly affect the value of the dollar, meaning bond markets wouldn't signal the danger.

The debate over Fed independence is misplaced; it has already been compromised. Evidence includes preemptive reappointments of regional bank presidents and outspokenness from governors concerned about being bullied, indicating the Fed no longer operates in its prior insulated environment.

The Federal Reserve is pressured to cut rates not just for economic stability, but to protect its own independence. Failing to act pre-emptively could lead to a recession, for which the Fed would be blamed. This would invite intense political pressure and calls for executive oversight, making rate cuts a defensive institutional maneuver.

Despite the perception of independence, the Federal Reserve historically yields to political pressure from the White House. Every US president, regardless of party, has ultimately obtained the monetary policy they desired, a pattern that has held true since the Fed's creation.