Get your free personalized podcast brief

We scan new podcasts and send you the top 5 insights daily.

Daniel Mahncke explains that GE generates only a 12% defense margin compared to 27% in commercial engines. The government finances roughly half of GE's total aerospace research and development in exchange for data rights. These cost-plus military contracts enforce strict profit caps and prevent catalog price increases on spare parts.

Related Insights

GE employs a razor-and-blades model on an industrial scale, accepting losses on initial engine sales to powerful airframers like Boeing. This secures a multi-decade, high-margin stream of mandated service and parts revenue from a fragmented base of airline customers, where aftermarket sales can be 3-5 times the original engine price.

The traditional "cost-plus" model pays contractors a percentage of their total costs. This creates a perverse incentive to increase project expenses and duration, as a higher cost base results in a larger absolute profit for the company.

Traditional defense contractors use a "cost-plus" model, earning a percentage of total costs, which incentivizes inefficiency. Anduril sells products at a fixed price, aligning its success with saving the government and taxpayers money.

Daniel Mahncke highlights that developing the LEAP engine required nine years of losses before breaking even in 2024. GE sells new equipment at break-even or steep discounts because each engine flies for 25 to 30 years. Over that life, services return three and a half times the original purchase revenue at 27% margins.

To combat inefficiency, the Pentagon is moving away from paying contractors for time and materials ('cost-plus'). The new model emphasizes business-oriented, fixed-price contracts where companies are paid upon successful, on-time delivery of a working product, introducing more risk and profit incentive for vendors.

Daniel Mahncke notes that under rate-per-flight-hour contracts, airlines pay a fixed fee while GE guarantees full maintenance coverage. GE's fuel-efficient LEAP engines run hotter, causing parts to degrade prematurely in hot, dusty climates after 1.5 years instead of five. Consequently, GE absorbed the overhaul costs, causing maintenance on new engines to lose money.

Legacy defense contractors on "cost-plus" models are incentivized to increase costs to boost profits. This is the opposite of the startup model, which must innovate to deliver superior products faster and cheaper to gain market share, injecting much-needed competition into the sector.

Investors often avoid aerospace assuming suppliers share the poor economics of airlines. In reality, engine and component makers like GE Aerospace, HEICO, and TransDigm earn robust profit margins between 18% and 27%. Extreme regulatory hurdles by bodies like the FAA require years of certification for every single part, creating immense barriers to entry and enabling suppliers to sell certified parts at massive price markups without commodity pricing pressures.

The standard "cost-plus" model guarantees contractors a profit margin on top of their expenses. This creates a perverse incentive to maximize costs and timelines, as 10% of a $3 billion project is far more lucrative than 10% of a $150 million one.

The CEO of Lockheed Martin made it clear that the company will not triple missile production on promises alone. They require government cost-sharing and firm financial commitments to de-risk the massive capital expenditure required to ramp up their capacity and that of their suppliers.

Cost-plus military contracts cap defense margins at half commercial levels | RiffOn