Presidential interest in a "bigger" ship, not naval strategy, spawned the concept for a massive, $14 billion battleship. This political project forces the Navy into a budgetary dilemma, potentially sacrificing next-generation aircraft for a single, expensive surface combatant that may not meet its actual strategic needs.
The nearly trillion-dollar US defense budget is misleading. The vast majority is locked into fixed costs like salaries, facilities, and sustaining legacy systems. The actual procurement budget for new technology is at a historic low as a percentage of GDP, constraining modernization.
A singular, massive cash infusion into the defense budget encourages buying more of today's systems, filling order books for weapons with built-in obsolescence. This approach creates a short-term 'sugar high' but fails to fund the adaptive industrial infrastructure needed for future conflicts, ultimately leading to a less capable force.
Many call for more large-scale societal projects like the Apollo or Manhattan Projects. However, these were not just public works; they were military or quasi-military efforts born from an arms race. Replicating them requires a more militarized society, a trade-off that is often overlooked.
The US Navy is shrinking despite stated goals to expand against threats like China, largely due to congressional budget dysfunction. "Continuing resolutions" prevent new ship starts and lead to billions in waste, while the Pentagon as a whole fails to spend about $15 billion annually, money which eventually evaporates.
A nation that can no longer get cooperation through seduction and shared values must resort to coercion. Trump's proposed $1.5 trillion military budget is a symptom of this decline, reflecting an empire that must use force or the threat of it to enforce its will on the world stage.
Aircraft carriers replaced battleships as the centerpiece of naval power because their planes could strike targets from farther away than any ship's guns. This "range advantage" principle is now being challenged by land-based anti-ship ballistic missiles that can outrange carrier air wings, questioning the carrier's modern relevance.
When purchasing a new ship or aircraft, the initial price tag is deceptive. The 'fully burdened cost' includes long-term expenses for crewing, training, support, and maintenance. A one-time budget increase doesn't cover this tail, forcing the military to retire platforms early and resulting in no net growth of the force.
Funded via a reconciliation bill with broad definitions, the "Golden Dome" missile defense project lacks a clear plan and rapid contracting. This delay makes its massive budget vulnerable to being reallocated for other purposes, risking an outcome similar to the California high-speed rail—a project with huge funding but little to show for it.
The defense procurement system was built when technology platforms lasted for decades, prioritizing getting it perfect over getting it fast. This risk-averse model is now a liability in an era of rapid innovation, as it stifles the experimentation and failure necessary for speed.
The perception of the defense budget as a massive fund for new technology is incorrect. More than half is allocated to fixed costs like personnel, facilities, and maintaining old equipment. The actual procurement budget for new systems is historically low as a percentage of GDP.