Politicians predictably declare initiatives for domestic production of critical goods like munitions or rare earths when dependencies are exposed. However, these declarations rarely translate into effective action, suggesting we must learn to manage economic entanglement as a form of mutual deterrence rather than wish it away.

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The romantic notion that the US can rapidly pivot its industrial base for war is a misleading myth. Today's weapons are vastly more complex and reliant on fragile global supply chains for components that are controlled by adversaries, making a WWII-style industrial mobilization impossible without years of preparation.

The administration's explicit focus on re-shoring manufacturing and preparing for potential geopolitical conflict provides a clear investment playbook. Capital should flow towards commodities and companies critical to the military-industrial complex, such as producers of copper, steel, and rare earth metals.

Counterintuitively, U.S. and global auto firms need to collaborate with Chinese suppliers to reduce strategic dependency. The model involves onshoring Chinese hardware and manufacturing expertise while maintaining national control over sensitive AI software and networks, creating a strategic "co-opetition."

The concept of 'weaponized interdependence,' highlighted by China's use of export controls, is driving Asian nations like Japan, India, and South Korea to implement economic security acts. This shifts investment toward domestic supply chains in critical minerals, semiconductors, and defense, creating state-backed opportunities.

The shift to a less adversarial China policy may be a strategic maneuver to avoid supply chain disruptions. The U.S. appears to be biding its time—likely for 5+ years—to wean itself off dependence on Chinese rare earth minerals, which are critical for both industry and defense manufacturing.

China demonstrated its significant leverage over the U.S. by quickly pressuring the Trump administration through a partial embargo on rare earth metals. This showcased a powerful non-tariff weapon rooted in its control of critical mineral supply chains, which are also vital for defense applications.

While headlines focus on advanced chips, China’s real leverage comes from its strategic control over less glamorous but essential upstream inputs like rare earths and magnets. It has even banned the export of magnet-making technology, creating critical, hard-to-solve bottlenecks for Western manufacturing.

The U.S. military's power is no longer backed by a robust domestic industrial base. Decades of offshoring have made it dependent on rivals like China for critical minerals and manufacturing. This means the country can no longer sustain a prolonged conflict, a reality its defense planners ignore.

Beyond raw materials, China's national ambition is to achieve near-total self-sufficiency. The prevailing mood is that there is "nothing for which it wants to rely on foreigners a single day longer than it has to." This philosophy of aggressive import substitution signals a fundamental break with the logic of reciprocal global trade.

Anticipating that independence from China will be a long-term, bipartisan US policy goal, Rivian intentionally designed its new R2 supply chain to be U.S.-centric. This strategic planning aims to align the business with persistent geopolitical trends, rather than just reacting to current tariffs.

Political Pledges for Supply Chain Independence Rarely Lead to Meaningful Action | RiffOn