For early-stage growth companies, an investment memo must prove a dual thesis: not only will the initial capital generate a fair return, but the company's progress will make it *more* attractive to buy additional shares at higher prices as it de-risks. If you wouldn't dollar-cost-average up, you shouldn't make the initial investment.
Mega-funds can justify paying "stupid prices" at the seed stage because they aren't underwriting a seed-stage return. Instead, they are buying an option on the next, much larger round where they'll deploy real capital. This allows them to outbid smaller funds who need to generate returns from the initial investment itself.
The memo details how investors rationalize enormous funding rounds for pre-product startups. By focusing on a colossal potential outcome (e.g., a $1 trillion valuation) and assuming even a minuscule probability (e.g., 0.1%), the calculated expected value can justify the investment, compelling participation despite the overwhelming odds of failure.
Some companies execute a 3-5 year plan and then revert to average returns. Others 'win by winning'—their success creates new opportunities and network effects, turning them into decade-long compounders that investors often sell too early.
Top growth investors deliberately allocate more of their diligence effort to understanding and underwriting massive upside scenarios (10x+ returns) rather than concentrating on mitigating potential downside. The power-law nature of venture returns makes this a rational focus for generating exceptional performance.
Contrary to the instinct to sell a big winner, top fund managers often hold onto their best-performing companies. The initial 10x return is a strong signal of a best-in-class product, team, and market, indicating potential for continued exponential growth rather than a peak.
A strategy for durable company-building is to aim for an enterprise value multiple that is highest in year 20. This long-term perspective focuses on the immense power of late-stage compounding growth and insulates the company from the volatility of short-term capital markets and technology hype.
When making early-stage investments, avoid the common pitfall of betting on just a great idea or just a great founder. A successful investment requires deep belief in both. Every time the speaker has invested with only one of the two criteria met, they have lost money. The mandate must be 'two for two.'
For startups experiencing hyper-growth, the optimal strategy is to raise capital aggressively and frequently—even multiple times a year—regardless of current cash reserves. This builds a war chest, solidifies a high valuation based on momentum, and effectively starves less explosive competitors of investor attention and capital.
For a proven, hyper-growth AI company, traditional business risks (market, operational, tech) are minimal. The sole risk for a late-stage investor is overpaying for several years of future growth that may decelerate faster than anticipated.
Financial models struggle to project sustained high growth rates (>30% YoY). Analysts naturally revert to the mean, causing them to undervalue companies that defy this and maintain high growth for years, creating an opportunity for investors who spot this persistence.