By defending the pro rata rights of early backers against new, powerful investors, founders play an "infinite game." This builds a reputation for fairness that compounds over time, attracting higher-quality partners and investors in future rounds.

Unlike in private equity, an early-stage venture investment is a bet on the founder. If an early advisor, IP holder, or previous investor holds significant control, it creates friction and hinders the CEO's ability to execute. QED's experience shows that these situations are untenable and should be avoided.

Founders are warned against being manipulated by late-stage investors who pressure them to strip rights (like pro-rata) from early backers. This disloyalty breaks trust and signals to new investors that the founder can also be manipulated, setting a dangerous precedent for future governance.

Founders must have conviction, as even their most sophisticated investors can fundamentally misjudge a bold strategic shift. A Sequoia Capital partner admits their own investors strongly opposed a pivotal move into logistics, demonstrating that founder vision must sometimes override expert consensus.

Daniel Lubetzky warns that entrepreneurs often mistakenly believe they can avoid culture clash after being acquired. The tension between a fast, transparent startup and a cautious, secretive corporation is a fundamental friction that founders should expect rather than hope to overcome.

The venture capital industry's tendency to fire founders is so ingrained that simply being founder-friendly became a competitive advantage for Founders Fund. Despite data showing founder-led companies outperform, the emotional 'thrill' of ousting a founder often leads VCs to make value-destructive decisions, creating a market inefficiency.

Daniel Lubetzky had a clause giving his PE investors the right to sell the company after five years. When their fund cycle demanded an exit, he wanted to continue growing. This misalignment forced him to raise $227 million to buy them out, a cautionary tale on fundraising terms.

An investor's power over a portfolio company is fundamentally limited and primarily negative. While a VC can block a founder's actions, such as through board approval or withholding capital, they cannot force a founder to take a specific path, even if it seems obviously correct. The role is to advise and assist, not to command or execute.

A 'hostile' takeover bid is not defined by personal animosity but by a specific procedural move. After being rejected by a target company's board, the acquirer bypasses them and makes their offer directly to the shareholders. The 'hostile' element is the act of circumventing the board's decision-making authority.