Despite a hugely profitable exit, Daniel Lubetzky's former PE partners invested in three competitors within three months, sharing his playbook. This illustrates that a PE firm's loyalty is to its fund and future deals, not to the founders who generated their past returns.

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Soon after taking a minority investment, Daniel Lubetzky's PE partners tried to force him out as CEO, threatening to poach key hires and ruin his business. He called their bluff, demonstrating the critical need for founders to anticipate and stand up to aggressive, misaligned investors.

There's a strong reluctance in venture capital to fund companies that are number two or three in a category dominated by a "kingmaker"—a startup already backed by a top-tier firm. This creates a powerful, self-fulfilling fundraising moat for the perceived leader, making it unpopular to back competitors.

In venture capital, an investor's reputation is constantly on the line. A successful exit in one fund doesn't satisfy the LPs of a subsequent fund. This creates relentless pressure to consistently perform, as you're only as good as your last hit and can never rest on past achievements.

To truly understand a potential financial partner, the Chomps team went beyond the supplied references. They found a founder whose company didn't succeed under the PE firm's investment. His positive review of the partner's character, despite the negative outcome, provided the most powerful signal of trust.

Contrary to the instinct to sell a big winner, top fund managers often hold onto their best-performing companies. The initial 10x return is a strong signal of a best-in-class product, team, and market, indicating potential for continued exponential growth rather than a peak.

When a private equity firm sells a passive stake of itself (the GP) to a large investor, it's often a negative signal. This ownership change frequently triggers a shift towards asset gathering and strategy proliferation, diluting the focus that generated the initial "great funds."

Daniel Lubetzky had a clause giving his PE investors the right to sell the company after five years. When their fund cycle demanded an exit, he wanted to continue growing. This misalignment forced him to raise $227 million to buy them out, a cautionary tale on fundraising terms.

Over 80% of TA's investments are proprietary deals with founders who aren't actively selling. Their strategy focuses on convincing profitable, growing businesses to partner to accelerate growth, framing the decision as "partner with us" versus "do nothing." This requires a long-term, relationship-based sourcing model.

Beyond financial incentives or strategic differences, a primary driver for a successful partner to spin out from an established firm can be pure ego. The desire to build something independently and prove one's own success is a powerful, albeit rarely admitted, motivation for starting a new venture.

When founders receive life-altering offers (e.g., billions of dollars), the long-term reputational game of venture capital collapses into a single-turn, "one and done" decision. This game theory shift incentivizes taking the immediate payout, overriding loyalty.

Kind's Ex-PE Partners Funded Competitors Immediately After Their 17x Exit | RiffOn