Recent, pointless-seeming wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have created a new version of "Vietnam Syndrome." This public and political aversion to foreign intervention makes it nearly impossible for the US to commit to providing crucial, early support in conflicts where it may be necessary, such as in Ukraine.

Former SECAF Frank Kendall warns that conflicts against less advanced adversaries like Iran reinforce outdated tactics and supply chains. This diverts focus and resources from developing the adaptive capabilities needed to counter a peer competitor like China, which presents a fundamentally different challenge.

The US's inability to achieve its objectives in Iran is not just a regional failure. It projects a global perception of weakness and a lack of appetite for total warfare. This directly encourages adversaries like China to be more aggressive with their strategic plans for Taiwan.

U.S. leaders repeatedly declare Chinese advancements in areas like high-speed rail or 5G as new "Sputnik moments." However, the lack of subsequent, meaningful action has diluted the term's impact, creating a "boy who cried wolf" effect and preventing a genuine sense of national crisis or urgency.

American military engagements abroad are a strategic boon for China. Each conflict distracts US resources and attention, effectively granting China a "free decade" of peace to continue its rapid economic and technological ascent without direct confrontation from its primary rival.

A poorly executed war in Iran is creating the conditions for a domestic political backlash against defense spending. This jeopardizes the multi-year effort to build up munition stockpiles and advanced systems specifically for a potential Taiwan contingency, thereby weakening America's long-term posture against China.

While the U.S. talks about pushing back against China, its military position in East Asia has declined relative to China's rapid buildup. Unlike during the Cold War, U.S. leaders haven't committed the necessary resources or explained the stakes to the American public.

China plays the long game. Instead of direct confrontation, its strategy is to wait for the U.S. to weaken itself through expensive military interventions and political division. This allows China to gain relative power without firing a shot, similar to its rise during the War on Terror.

Despite China's long-term strategic relevance, its use as a political argument is less effective today. Politicians and the public are focused on more immediate threats like the state of U.S. democracy and the war in the Middle East, which now dominate political discourse.