While competitors rush to offer semi-liquid private equity funds to wealth clients, Apollo has deliberately abstained. They believe the illiquid nature of PE assets creates a profound liquidity mismatch with redemption features, risking a poor client experience in a prolonged downturn.
The catalyst for a private credit crisis will be publicly traded, daily NAV funds. These vehicles promise investors daily liquidity while holding assets that are completely illiquid. This mismatch creates the perfect conditions for a "run on the bank" scenario during a market downturn.
While the dollar value of PE distributions has been stable, the unrealized book value (NAV) has tripled in five years. This has caused the distribution yield—distributions relative to NAV—to plummet to a historic low. This yield metric, not raw dollar exits, is the critical factor constraining LP capital and new fund commitments.
To combat the misconception of easy access to cash, Goldman Sachs has internally banned the common industry term "semi-liquid" for its alternative funds. This linguistic shift is a deliberate risk management strategy to underscore that while these products have liquidity features, they are fundamentally illiquid and access to capital is never guaranteed.
When high-yield bonds yielded only 4.5% in late 2021, Apollo abstained, viewing it as poor risk-return. Because they invest their own capital heavily alongside clients, they have the discipline to sit out popular but overpriced markets, even if it means forgoing AUM growth that competitors chased.
Offering daily liquidity while pursuing a multi-year investment strategy creates a dangerous duration mismatch. When investors inevitably demand their cash during a downturn, the long-term thesis is shattered, forcing fire sales and destroying value. A fund's liquidity terms must align with its investment horizon.
Unlike illiquid private equity, private credit funds provide a steady stream of cash flow through coupon payments. This self-liquidating feature perfectly solves the liquidity needs of the private wealth channel, making it a far more suitable and popular alternative asset for that investor base.
The private equity market has abundant capital and willing companies, yet transactions are stalled. This is because General Partners (GPs) fear selling at low returns and Limited Partners (LPs) fear over-commitment due to liquidity concerns, creating a gridlock where no one wants to act.
While retail investors may demand daily pricing for private assets, this eliminates the "hidden benefit" of illiquidity that historically forced a long-term perspective. Constant valuation updates could encourage emotional, short-term trading, negating a core advantage of the asset class: staying the course.
Institutional allocators are currently over-allocated to illiquid private assets due to the denominator effect. When distributions from these funds finally resume, the initial wave of capital will be used to rebalance portfolios back toward public markets, not immediately recycled into new private equity commitments, a trend private GPs may not see coming.
The firm intentionally structures its private debt funds for institutional investors without redemption options. They view offering liquidity on an inherently illiquid asset as a risky asset-liability mismatch, questioning competitors who promise an "illiquidity premium without the illiquidity."