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The US once viewed ocean exploration as a co-equal goal to the moon landing. However, the death of an aquanaut in the Navy's Sea Lab program, combined with budget diversions to the Vietnam War and heavy classification during the Cold War, halted this momentum for 50 years.

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Neil deGrasse Tyson argues that massive, expensive undertakings like the moon landing or a future Mars mission are only funded due to defense or economic motivations, such as beating a rival nation (e.g., the USSR, China), not for the sake of exploration itself.

The U.S. Navy's ability to track Soviet submarines while keeping its own hidden threatened the USSR's second-strike capability, the cornerstone of nuclear deterrence. This technological and financial asymmetry pushed the Soviets toward de-escalation and ultimately, ending the war.

While China vastly outproduces the US in ships and aerial drones, the underwater drone space is a domain where the US can still gain a decisive advantage. Both countries produce only hundreds of autonomous underwater vehicles annually, operating on the same order of magnitude.

Many call for more large-scale societal projects like the Apollo or Manhattan Projects. However, these were not just public works; they were military or quasi-military efforts born from an arms race. Replicating them requires a more militarized society, a trade-off that is often overlooked.

Rickover purposefully distinguished between engineers and scientists, showing disdain for the latter's theoretical focus. He prioritized building practical, reliable systems—like choosing a simple water-cooled reactor—over more advanced but unproven designs, enabling him to deliver the nuclear submarine years ahead of schedule.

After the Cold War, the US de-emphasized manufacturing, creating a massive skills gap. Today, the money exists to build more submarines, but the trained welders, machinists, and engineers do not. This human capital deficit, not budget, is the primary obstacle to scaling production.

Failing to return to the moon after decades of promises and $100 billion in spending would signal to rivals that the U.S. is "broken." This perceived weakness in the strategic domain of space could embolden adversaries to challenge U.S. interests in other critical technological and geopolitical areas.

Nuclear submarines can stay submerged for 90 days, limited by their food supply, not energy. The onboard nuclear reactor provides limitless power to convert seawater into breathable air and water, demonstrating how a single technological leap can completely redefine a system's constraints.

Neil deGrasse Tyson argues the US's renewed interest in lunar exploration is a direct response to China's ambitions. It's a geopolitical maneuver for prestige and strategic positioning, much like the Cold War space race, rather than a quest for scientific discovery or immediate economic benefit.

The Department of War's 'peacetime speed' isn't just bureaucratic inertia. It traces back to a 'Last Supper' event where Pentagon leaders intentionally told industry to slow innovation and consolidate. This historical context reveals the deep-seated cultural challenges in accelerating defense procurement today.

America's 1960s Undersea Ambitions Were Derailed by a Single Death and the Vietnam War | RiffOn