The government inevitably acts as an "insurer of last resort" during systemic crises to prevent economic collapse. The danger, highlighted by the OpenAI controversy, is when companies expect it to be an "insurer of first resort," which encourages reckless risk-taking by socializing losses while privatizing gains.

Official White House and Department of War documents outline a "burden sharing" doctrine. This policy dictates that when the U.S. acts in its own interest, allies must bear the consequential burdens, including military casualties and economic fallout. Israel is explicitly named as the model for this approach.

Israeli leadership recognizes that American public opinion, particularly among younger generations, is turning against them. They are likely using the current pro-Israel US administration as a final window of opportunity to expand territory and create irreversible facts on the ground before that support evaporates.

While the US and Israel launched a joint military campaign against Iran, subsequent peace negotiations were handled exclusively by the US. This reveals that despite their close alliance, America unilaterally dictates the terms for ending conflicts, leaving Israel with little choice but to comply.

The US needed a conflict that offered the 'appearance of victory' and could be quickly concluded. Israel's goals were more fundamental: ensuring it could never again face a surprise attack, implying a longer, more disruptive war. This misalignment created strategic tension between the allies.

External powers signaling potential intervention, as the U.S. did in Iran and others did regarding Syria, can create a dangerous "now or never" mentality among protestors. This moral hazard encourages riskier actions on the ground, but when the promised support never materializes, it's the local population that pays the ultimate price.

Israel's initial war plan was a targeted campaign against Iran's ballistic missile project. The conflict escalated into a broader, less attainable mission of regime change after the Trump administration joined, demonstrating how a powerful ally's involvement can lead to strategic "mission creep."

Key US allies have incentives for America to enter a conflict with Iran but not win decisively. The ideal outcome for them is a weakened Iran and a distracted, overextended America that is more dependent on their cooperation. This subverts the simple narrative of a unified coalition, revealing a complex web of self-interest.

The administration justified its attack by claiming it had to preempt an inevitable Israeli strike and the subsequent Iranian retaliation. This reasoning is flawed because it ignores the more direct and less escalatory option: using US influence to stop its ally, Israel, from launching the initial attack.