In frothy markets with multi-billion dollar valuations, a key learned behavior from 2021 is for VCs to sell 10-20% of their stake during a large funding round. This provides early liquidity and distributions (DPI) to LPs, who are grateful for the cash back, and de-risks the fund's position.
Limited Partners should resist pressuring VCs for early exits to lock in DPI. The best companies compound value at incredible rates, making it optimal to hold winners. Instead, LPs should manage portfolio duration and liquidity by building a balanced portfolio of early-stage, growth, and secondary fund investments.
VCs are willing to "hold their nose" and pay extremely high multiples for one or two exceptional companies they feel are essential to win. However, unlike in 2021, they are not applying this undisciplined, high-valuation strategy to their entire portfolio, demonstrating a more disciplined approach to portfolio construction.
Despite seeing 100x revenue multiples reminiscent of 2021, VCs are not accelerating their fund deployment or rushing back to fundraise. This more measured pace indicates a potential lesson learned from the last bubble, where rapid deployment led to poor vintage performance and pressure from LPs.
The default VC practice of distributing shares after an IPO lockup can leave massive gains on the table. Missing a multi-billion dollar run-up suggests a more nuanced, case-by-case discussion with LPs is needed, as holding can be the difference between a 5x and a 15x fund.
The standard VC practice of distributing shares to LPs immediately after a lockup expires can be a multi-billion dollar error. The case of selling Reddit at a $9B valuation, only to see it rise much higher, highlights that VCs may need to evolve into holding public positions longer, challenging the traditional model.
The rise of founder-optimized fundraising—raising smaller, more frequent rounds to minimize dilution—is systematically eroding traditional VC ownership models. What is a savvy capital strategy for a founder directly translates into a VC failing to meet their ownership targets, creating a fundamental conflict in the ecosystem.
TA's compensation structure aligns partner incentives directly with investor returns. The primary way for partners to increase their ownership (carry) is by generating realized gains—i.e., returning capital to Limited Partners. This systemically prioritizes liquidity and successful exits over simply deploying capital or marking up portfolio value on paper.
After discovering that buyers of their portfolio companies were achieving 3x returns, TA shifted its strategy. Instead of selling 100%, they now often sell partial stakes. This provides liquidity to LPs and de-risks the investment while allowing TA to capture significant upside from the company's continued compounding growth.
AI startups' explosive growth ($1M to $100M ARR in 2 years) will make venture's power law even more extreme. LPs may need a new evaluation model, underwriting VCs across "bundles of three funds" where they expect two modest performers (e.g., 1.5x) and one massive outlier (10x) to drive overall returns.
Contrary to the common VC advice to "play the game on the field" during hot markets, Founder Collective reduces its check size for high-valuation deals. This strategy allows them to maintain exposure to promising companies while intentionally keeping the fund's overall weighted average cost basis low.