Unlike typical government welfare, aid money in Argentina, even from international sources, is channeled through Peronist party operatives who hand it out physically. This frames the aid as a personal gift from the party, creating a powerful system of dependency and political obligation.

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Argentina's Peronist Party Secures Loyalty by Directly Distributing Aid as Cash | RiffOn