The U.S. is more likely to follow Argentina's path: currency inflation, populist policies funded by deficit spending, and an eventual economic collapse leading to a century of stagnation. This is a more insidious threat than a dramatic revolution.

Unprecedented US financial support, likened to Draghi's "whatever it takes," has successfully created a circuit breaker for Argentina's negative market feedback loop. However, this support only addresses financial symptoms (FX and credit risk) and cannot solve the underlying political uncertainty about the government's ability to implement reforms.

Modern global conflict is primarily economic, not kinetic. Nations now engage in strategic warfare through currency debasement, asset seizures, and manipulating capital flows. The objective is to inflict maximum financial damage on adversaries, making economic policy a primary weapon of war.

Given the unreliability of polling, markets will wait for tangible results before reacting. The composition of congress will be the first concrete signal, with a divided or right-leaning legislature seen as a positive check on executive power. This could trigger currency rallies well before the final presidential outcome is known.

Knowing they would perform well in Buenos Aires, the Peronist party strategically held an early local election. They correctly anticipated President Milei would over-promise on his party's performance, creating a negative market reaction when he under-delivered, thereby executing a "perfectly executed attack" on his program's stability.

While overall EM credit spreads are near post-GFC tights, making value scarce, Argentina stands out. Following positive legislative election results, its sovereign debt has rallied significantly but remains wide compared to its own history and peer countries, suggesting substantial room for further performance in an otherwise expensive market.

During a hearing, a Second Circuit judge bluntly asked Argentina's lawyer, "Why would anybody who can read ever buy a bond from Argentina?" This off-the-cuff remark perfectly captures the profound market skepticism and reputational damage resulting from the country's long history of serial defaults.

In today's hyper-financialized economy, central banks no longer need to actually buy assets to stop a crisis. The mere announcement of their willingness to act, like the Fed's 2020 corporate bond facility, is enough to restore market confidence as traders front-run the intervention.

Unlike countries with no recent memory of economic collapse, nations like Greece, Spain, and Italy—and potentially now Argentina—that have endured hyperinflation are more likely to elect reformist governments. The population internalizes the cost of fiscal irresponsibility and votes to avoid repeating the disaster.